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Preface to Second Edition
Our goal in publishing the first edition of this casebook a couple of years ago was to
create a systematic approach to the study of the public trust doctrine (PTD), and we think our
book has helped to begin the institutionalization of the doctrine in law study.
In this second edition, we have included several significant developments in what is a
rapidly evolving body of law. The most notable new decision is Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth (p. __), a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which has quickly
become a foundational decision. We have also included the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion
in Rock-Koskonong Lake District v. Department of Natural Resources (p. __) , in which the court
narrowly interpreted the scope of that state’s PTD, arguably misinterpreting that court’s seminal
decision of Just v. Marinette County (p. __) in the process. A case which may expand the scope
of the PTD in California to groundwater is Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water
Resources Control Board (p. __), although whether California will join states like Hawaii and
Vermont that recognize groundwater as a trust resource awaits whether the environmental
claimants can prove a link between groundwater pumping and the surface flows of the navigable
Scott River.
There have been a considerable number of developments in the cluster of cases that seek
to recognize the atmosphere as a trust resource, and we discuss these developments in some
detail in chapter 11 (pp. __). A steady stream of case law also continues to arise out of efforts of
members of the public to access trust resources, mostly in the context of waterways experiencing
monopoly control (pp. __). We also have updated the text to expand our consideration of the
PTD abroad to include considerable case law from Indonesia (p. __), a constitutional amendment
in Norway (p. __), and statutory developments in Britain and the Nordic countries (p. __).
There are other changes as well. The above summary reflects only a snapshot of
developments in this rapidly expanding area of law. We expect the pace of change to accelerate
in the near future, and we pledge to try to keep current with it.
We continue to believe that this course is an ideal upper-level course in environmental
law. It offers a common-law based approach to environmental decision making, a contrast in a
field dominated by statutes and administrative regulations. Although there is a role for statutory
and regulatory interpretations of the PTD, there is little doubt that the vibrant center of the PTD
lies in a judiciary that understands the importance of trust resources to both present and future
generations. That in turn requires courts that are schooled in the doctrine’s history, its evolution
in other jurisdictions, and the fundamental anti-monopolistic purposes it has always served and
continues to serve, including intergenerational equity.
We hope this effort contributes to the evolution of the PTD in the 21st century by
educating the next generation of lawyers who must convince judges of the role the PTD can play
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in a world that is becoming increasingly crowded, experiencing the diminishment of trust
resources, and threatened with climate change which will imperil trust resources first.
MCB
MCW
February 2015
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Preface to the First Edition
The public trust doctrine (PTD) is an ancient doctrine of property law that
governs sovereign stewardship of natural resources. First surfacing in Roman law through
the Justinian Code, it was revived in medieval England largely through the efforts of Sir
Mathew Hale and became entrenched in American law in the nineteenth century through
the process of statehood. In the twentieth century, the doctrine became a favorite of the
law professoriate and the environmental community for its potential to recognize public
rights in private property. The doctrine both promotes public access to trust resources and
justifies government protection of them. It also equips the public — the beneficiaries of
the trust — with the right to challenge government on the management of their ecological
assets. This doctrine, remarkable for its endurance through the ages, now brings populist
overtones and human rights underpinnings to the modern fields of environmental law and
property law.
We offer the first casebook on public trust law. In it, we have endeavored to
capture the rich history and considerable diversity of the field. Although the PTD is often
characterized as a doctrine of state law, we think the perception is erroneous because the
PTD is an inherent attribute of sovereignty and, accordingly, should apply to both the
federal and state governments. The origins of the American PTD lie in bilateral federalstate agreements admitting states to the Union, but the doctrine is also recognized in
countries as far-flung as India, the Philippines, Kenya, and Brazil. We survey the PTD's
application from the local to global level.
The wellspring of the American PTD lies in a distinctive antimonopoly sentiment
that, widespread in the nineteenth century, continues to inspire a vibrant body of case law
concerning public access to trust resources. That case law — as well as state constitutions
and statutes — has expanded the scope of trust assets from lands submerged beneath
navigable waters to wetlands, beaches, parklands, wildlife, air, and groundwater.
Internationally, the doctrine has advanced concepts of sustainable development and the
precautionary principle, and thus is frequently linked to the public's right to life, health,
and environmental protection. There are ongoing efforts to use the PTD to combat
climate change by applying it to curb carbon emissions.
While the origins of the PTD date to Roman times, the PTD carries enormous
importance today, as many statutory systems fail in their basic purpose of protecting
public resources from private exploitation. A course in public trust law allows students to
break out of the narrow confines of statutory law and immerse themselves in fundamental
principles that provide a fulcrum for sustainable environmental management. The course
can, and we think should, delve into the most basic questions of constitutionalism and the
role of the judiciary, legislatures, and courts in allocating natural resources.
At less than 500 pages, we think this book is ideal for an advanced course or
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seminar in environmental, natural resources, or property law. The casebook is
accompanied by a teachers' manual as well. We have designed the text not only as a set of
teaching materials, but also as a research platform for further inquiry into public trust
law. We have relied heavily on the rich scholarship in public trust law and have tried to
supplement it. Students in our classes have produced multiple summaries of state public
trust law as well as law review notes and articles analyzing some of the most intriguing
questions generated by the doctrine. We encourage you to send us cases and materials
and as well as your contributions to the law of the public trust, which we will use in new
editions of this text and in a treatise on the subject.
MCB
MCW
December 2012
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Authors’ Note
We edited the case law liberally throughout for readability, eliminating redundant
citations and sometimes creating paragraphs. Any footnotes are numbered consecutively
throughout chapters; we did not retain the original footnote numbers.
Case citations in the text, the footnotes of judicial opinions, and the writings of
commentators have been omitted without so specifying. Footnotes in judicial opinions and
articles are also omitted without specifying. Asterisks and brackets are used to designate
omissions from the original materials.
Excerpts from the following books and articles appear with the kind permission of the
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Chapter 2
The Foundation Cases
As indicated by both Professors Sax and Wilkinson, the origins of the public trust
doctrine lie in Roman law, in the Institutes of Justinian, in the English Magna Charta, and the
writings of Sir Matthew Hale. Transported across the Atlantic, the first manifestation of the
doctrine occurred in an early 19th century case. In Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810),
involving a claim by a riparian owner to exclusive rights to harvest fish to the middle of the
Susquehanna River, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that shoreside landowner has "no
exclusive right to fish in the river immediately in front of his lands . . . [because] the right to
fisheries in [a large freshwater river not subject to tidal influence] is vested in the state, and open
to all . . . ." Id. at 477. This recognition was one of the earliest from American courts enlarging
the scope of public rights from tidal waters to navigable-in-fact waters, which would become the
generic American rule in the late 19th century. The case below, decided eleven years after
Carson, proved influential, as the U.S. Supreme Court relied on it in the 1842 Martin v. Waddell
decision which follows the case below.
Arnold v. Mundy
Supreme Court of New Jersey
6 N.J.L. 1 (1821)
[In 1818, Benjamin Mundy led a group of oyster boats up the Raritan River to an
extremely productive shellfishery that was adjacent to land owned by Robert Arnold, a farmer
who claimed he planted the oysters and staked off the area. Mundy and his colleagues proceeded
to harvest oysters, and Arnold filed suit. Mundy defended on the ground that because the river
was navigable, the public had harvesting rights. At trial, Mundy prevailed, and Arnold appealed.]
JUDGE ANDREW KIRKPATRICK, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
affirmed in the following opinion1:
***
The grant of Charles II to the duke of York was not only of territory but of government
also. It was made, not with a view to give that territory and that government to the duke, to be
enjoyed as a private estate, but with a view to the settlement of it as a great colony, to the
enlargement of the British Empire, and the extension of its laws and dominions. In construing
this grant, therefore, we ought always to have our eye fixed upon these great objects. If we shall
find some things contained in it, which by the laws of England, as well as of all other civilized
countries, and even by the very law of nature itself, are declared to be the common property of
all men, then, by every fair rule of construction, we are to consider these things as granted to
him, as the representative of the sovereign, and as a trustee to support the title for the common
use, and especially so, if we shall find that the king himself had no other dominion over them.
The grant is not only of all lands, but of "all rivers, harbours, waters, fishings, etc. and of
1

We have eliminated most italics used by the court.—Eds.
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all other royalties, so far as the king had estate, right, title, or interest therein, together with full
and absolute power and authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern, and rule all such the
subjects of the king, his heirs, and successors, as should, from time to time, adventure themselves
into the said territory;" and for this purpose to make statutes, ordinances, etc. provided the same
should not be contrary to the laws, statutes, and government of England, but saving to the
inhabitants, nevertheless, the right of appeal, and to the crown the right of hearing and
determining the same. The duke was to govern, but he was to govern, substantially, according to
the principles of the British constitution. The colonists were to be governed by him, but, by the
very words of the charter, they were to be British subjects, and to enjoy the protection, liberty,
and privileges of the British government. In order to accomplish those great objects, the king
selected his royal brother, and granted to him all the rights which he himself had, or could
exercise in and over this great territory, saving to himself only the right of hearing appeals.
Those things, therefore, which were, properly speaking, the subjects of property, and which the
king himself could divide and grant severally to the settlers, the duke by virtue of this charter,
could also divide and grant; but those things which were not so, and which the king could not
grant, but held for the common use, the duke necessarily held for the same use, and in the same
way.
Let us see, then, upon what principle the king held the subject matter of this inquiry; what
right he had in it, and how far he could dispose of it.
Every thing susceptible of property is considered as belonging to the nation that
possesses the country, and as forming the entire mass of its wealth. But the nation does not
possess all those things in the same manner. By very far the greater part of them are divided
among the individuals of the nation, and become private property. Those things not divided
among the individuals still belong to the nation, and are called public property. Of these, again,
some are reserved for the necessities of the state, and are used for the public benefit, and those
are called "the domain of the crown or of the republic;" others remain common to all the citizens,
who take of them and use them, each according to his necessities, and according to the laws
which regulate their use, and are called common property. Of this latter kind, according to the
writers upon the law of nature and of nations, and upon the civil law, are the air, the running
water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts. Vattel lib. i, 20. 2 Black. Com. 14. But inasmuch as
the things which constitute this common property are things in which a sort of transient
usufructuary possession, only, can be had; and inasmuch as the title to them and to the soil by
which they are supported, and to which they are appurtenant, cannot well, according to the
common law notion of title, be vested in all the people; therefore, the wisdom of that law has
placed it in the hands of the sovereign power, to be held, protected, and regulated for the
common use and benefit. But still, though this title, strictly speaking, is in the sovereign, yet the
use is common to all the people. This principle, with respect to rivers and arms of the sea, is
clearly maintained in the case of the royal fishery upon the Banne, in Ireland . . . .
In Lord Fitzwalter's case, (1 Mod. 105) it is said, that in an action of trespass for fishing
in a river, where the tide flows and reflows, it is a good justification to say, that . . . prima facie,
the fishing is common to all. In Warren v. Matthews, (6 Mod. 73) we are told every subject of
common right may fish with lawful nets in a navigable river, as well as in the sea, and the king's
grant cannot bar him thereof. Same case (Salk. 357). Carter v. Marcott (Bun. 2162). In navigable
rivers, the fishery is common, it is prima facie in the king, but is public and for the common use.
2
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Nothing can be more clear, therefore, than, that part of the property of a nation which has
not been divided among the individuals, and which Vattel calls public property, is divided into
two kinds, one destined for the use of the nation in its aggregate national capacity, being a source
of the public revenue, to defray the public expense, called the domain of the crown, and the other
destined for the common use and immediate enjoyment of every individual citizen, according to
his necessity, being the immediate gift of nature to all men, and, therefore, called the common
property. The title of both these, for the greater order, and, perhaps, of necessity, is placed in the
hands of the sovereign power, but it is placed there for different purposes. The citizen cannot
enter upon the domain of the crown and apply it, or any part of it, to his immediate use. He
cannot go into the king's forests and fall and carry away the trees, though it is the public
property; it is placed in the hands of the king for a different purpose, it is the domain of the
crown, a source of revenue; so neither can the king intrude upon the common property, thus
understood, and appropriate it to himself, or to the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of
it is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary power; and that,
in theory at least, could not exist in a free government, such as England has always claimed to
be.
But if this be so it will be asked, how does it happen that in England, whose polity in this
respect we are now examining, we find not only navigable rivers, but also arms of the sea, ports,
harbours, and certain portions of the main sea itself upon the coasts, and all the fisheries
appertaining to them in the hands of individuals. That the fact is so cannot be controverted; but
how it became so is not so easy, at this period of time, satisfactorily to [show]. So far as it
depends upon royal grant, however, it seems pretty clear that it has always been considered as an
encroachment upon the common rights of the people.
***
Lord Hale says, "the sea, and the arms of the sea, and the navigable rivers in which the
tide ebbs and flows, are of the dominion of the king, as of his proper inheritance; and that this
dominion, embraces, also, the shores, litora, the spaces covered with the slime and mud
deposited by the water between the high and the low water mark, in the ordinary flow and reflow
of the tide; that this dominion consists, first, in the right of jurisdiction which he exercises by his
maritime courts; and, secondly, in the right of fishing in the waters; but that though the king is
the owner of these waters, and, as consequent of his property, hath the primary right of fishing
therein, yet the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea, and the
creeks and the arms thereof, as a public common piscary, and may not, without injury to their
right, be restrained thereof." This is his general doctrine.
***
Then as to the case of the Banne water in Ireland. It was this: the plaintiff had obtained a
royal grant for the territory of Rout, adjoining the river Banne . . . . And the question was,
whether this fishery passed by the grant? and it was held, that it did not; not indeed, upon the
principle, that the king could not grant in that case, but upon the construction of the grant.
In the discussion of the case, however, it was laid down, "that every navigable river, so
far as the tide ebbs and flows, is a royal river, and that the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and
belongs to the king by his prerogative; arid the reason is, that the river participates of the nature
of the sea, and is said to be a branch of the sea so far as it flows; and the sea is not only under the
3
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dominion of the king, but it is also his proper inheritance, and, therefore, he shall have the land
gained out of it, and also the grand fishes of the sea, such as whales, sturgeons, etc., which are
royal fish, and no subject can have them without the king's special grant; and he shall have the
wild swans also, as royal fowls, on the sea and its branches."
***
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, as I was at the trial, that by the law of nature,
which is the only true foundation of all the social rights; that by the civil law, which formerly
governed almost the whole civilized world, and which is still the foundation of the polity of
almost every nation in Europe; that by the common law of England, of which our ancestors
boasted, and to which it were well if we ourselves paid a more sacred regard; I say I am of
opinion, that by all these, the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the
bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under the water, for the purpose
of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the
water and its products (a few things excepted) are common to all the citizens, and that each has a
right to use them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use;
that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in him not
for his own use, but for the use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and immediate enjoyment.
I am of opinion, that this great principle of the common law was, in ancient times, in
England gradually encroached upon and broken down; that the powerful barons, in some
instances, appropriated to themselves these common rights; that the kings themselves, also, in
some instances during the same period, granted them out to their courtiers and favourites; and
that these seizures and these royal favours are the ground of all the several fisheries in England,
now claimed either by prescription or by grant; that the great charter, as it is commonly called,
which was nothing but a restoration of common right, though it did not annul, but confirmed,
what had been thus tortiously done, yet restored again the principles of the common law, in this
as well as in many other respects; and since that time no king of England has had the power of
granting away these common rights, and thereby despoiling the subject of the enjoyment of
them.
I am of opinion, that when Charles II took possession of this country, by his right of
discovery, he took possession of it in his sovereign capacity; that he had the same right in it, and
the same power over it, as he had in and over his other dominions, and no more; that this right
consisted chiefly in the power of granting the soil to private citizens for the purposes of
settlement and colonization, of establishing a government, of appointing a governor, of
conveying to him all those things appurtenant to the sovereignty, commonly called royalties, for
the benefit of colonists; but that he could not, and never did, so grant what is called the common
property as to convert it into private property; that these royalties, therefore, which constitute that
common property of which the rivers, bays, ports, and coasts of the sea were part, by the grant of
king Charles, passed to the duke of York, the governor of the province exercising the royal
authority for the public benefit, and not as the proprietor of the soil, and for his own private use;
and that if they passed from the duke of York to his grantees, which is a very doubtful question,
then, upon the surrender of the government, as appurtenant thereto, and inseparable therefrom,
they reverted to the crown of England.
And I am further of opinion, that, upon the Revolution, all these royal rights became
4
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vested in the people of New Jersey as the sovereign of the country, and are now in their hands;
and that they, having, themselves, both the legal title and the usufruct, may make such
disposition of them, and such regulation concerning them, as they may think fit; that this power
of disposition and regulation must be exercised by them in their sovereign capacity; that the
legislature is their rightful representative in this respect, and, therefore, that the legislature, in the
exercise of this power, may lawfully erect ports, harbours, basins, docks, and wharves on the
coasts of the sea and in the arms thereof, and in the navigable rivers; that they may bank off
those waters and reclaim the land upon the shores; that they may build dams, locks, and bridges
for the improvement of the navigation and the ease of passage; that they may clear and improve
fishing places, to increase the product of the fishery; that they may create, enlarge, and improve
oyster beds, by planting oysters therein in order to procure a more ample supply; that they may
do these things, themselves, at the public expense, or they may authorize others to do it by their
own labour, and at their own expense, giving them reasonable tolls, rents, profits, or exclusive
and temporary enjoyments; but still this power, which may be thus exercised by the sovereignty
of the state, is nothing more than what is called the jus regium [i.e., the police power — Eds.],
the right of regulating, improving, and securing for the common benefit of every individual
citizen. The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law
of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the
waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be a grievance
which never could be long borne by a free people.
From this statement, it is seen that, in my opinion, the proprietors, as such, never had,
since the surrender of the government, any such right to, interest in, or power over, these waters,
or the land covered by them, as that they could convey the same and convert them into private
property; and that, therefore, the grant in question is void, and ought not to prevail for the benefit
of the plaintiff, and, of course, that the rule to show cause must be discharged.
Notes
1.
Arnold v. Mundy was a test case, occasioned by a Benjamin Mundy-led fleet of
oyster boats up the Raritan River, challenging Robert Arnold's claim of an exclusive fishery
based on his ownership of riparian land. Both were eager to "try the right." As Bonnie McCay
recounted in OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND ECOLOGY IN NEW
JERSEY HISTORY 45–47 (1998), this was a "social action, intended not just to grab a few oysters,
but to get the attention of the courts." Arnold proceeded to sue Mundy in local county court, and
Mundy defended on the basis that Arnold could not exclude fishers from a navigable river,
claiming that everyone had a common right to harvest oysters in a navigable water. The dispute
produced the first significant articulation of the public trust doctrine in America.
2.
Chief Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick, who served on the New Jersey Supreme Court
for over a quarter-century and as Chief Justice for over twenty years, not only upheld Mundy's
rights to harvest, he ruled that Arnold didn't own the bed of the Raritan River. Instead, the state
owned the riverbed. The assumption was that public riverbed ownership was necessary to public
access to the oysters, which might have been due to the fact that oyster beds are attached to the
riverbed. But isn't it conceivable that the public might have rights to fish in privately-owned
riverbeds, on the theory that the public trust impressed a public easement on the waterway,
regardless of bed ownership?
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3.
The case relied on the Irish case, Royal Fishery of the Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540,
152, 155 (K.B. 1611); involving rights to fish for salmon on an Irish tidal river, in which the
court divided rivers into navigable and non-navigable waters, based on tidal influence. The
former were royal rivers belonging to the King; the latter were owned by riparian landowners.
The case began the link between public rights to fish and the navigability of the waterway.
4.
The decision also mentions Emer de Vattel's treatise, THE LAW OF NATIONS
(1758, English translation, 1760), which reiterated the Justinian claims about the public nature of
"the air, the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts." Vattel, who was influenced by
the writings of Gottried Leibniz and Hugo Grotius, was read widely by the Revolutionary
generation, including Benjamin Franklin and George Washington.
5.
Justice Kirkpatrick relied heavily on Sir Matthew Hale's treatise in support of his
conclusion of the paramount role of public rights. Hale's treatise DE JURE MARIS, written around
1660, was not published until 1786, thirty-five years before the Arnold v. Mundy decision. Hale
maintained that although the English King "owned" navigable waters, the public had a right to
fish in them — "a public common piscary . . . ." Based largely on Hale, Kirkpatrick concluded
that both the water and the bed of navigable waters are publicly held, and that all citizens have
the right to navigate and fish in navigable waters, subject to regulation. This public property was,
according to Kirkpatrick, vested in the sovereign for use by its citizens.
6.
Kirkpatrick acknowledged that the public's property right had been encroached by
both kings and barons, and claimed that the Magna Carta was designed to restore the public's
rights by limiting the king's power to alienate common property rights.
7.
Note that, according to Justice Kirkpatrick, the discovery doctrine gave the king
sovereign ownership of New Jersey, which passed to the state after the Revolutionary War.
Sovereign ownership gave the king the power to grant "the soil" to individuals and to establish a
government. But it did not give the right to convert public property in rivers, bays, ports, and
coasts into private property. Although the state legislature could authorize the filling, damming,
and reclamation of waterways, it could not make a "direct and absolute grant of the waters of the
state," divesting citizens of their common rights consistent with the "law of nature and the
constitution of a well ordered society." This latter insight of the limits of the state's sovereign
powers — a restraint on alienation — presaged the U.S. Supreme Court's 1892 decision in the
Illinois Central Railroad decision (p. 68). Justice Kirkpatrick stated that making an absolute
grant of the waters of the state would "be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people." Does this language underscore a sense of popular sovereignty underlying the trust?
Does it suggest that the trust ranks fundamental to democracy by protecting public access to
resources needed for the citizens' welfare? The statement was quoted in the Illinois Central
Railroad decision as well. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892).
8.
Another adumbration of Illinois Central was the distinction Justice Kirkpatrick
drew between public lands “destined for the use of the nation in its aggregate national capacity,
being a source of the public revenue, to defray the public expense, called the domain of the
crown, and the other destined for the common use and immediate enjoyment of every individual
citizen, according to his necessity, being the immediate gift of nature to all men, and, therefore,
called the common property.” The Supreme Court would endorse this distinction between public
property destined to raise revenue, perhaps by sale, and public trust property reserved for
common use.
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9.
Observe that Justice Kirkpatrick upheld the doctrine of common ownership
despite recognizing its longtime violation in England prior to the Magna Carta. His approach
underscores that a legal doctrine should not be defined by its violation.
10
The Arnold v. Mundy opinion repeatedly finds the source of the rule that
navigable waters are common property, owned by the sovereign in trust, to be in natural law—or
“the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society.” Isn’t this
another way of saying that the public trust doctrine imposes inherent limits on sovereign powers?
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee
Supreme Court of the United States
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)
[In 1835, William Waddell's lessee filed suit in federal court seeking to eject Merrit
Martin and others from harvesting oysters on one hundred acres of submerged lands allegedly
owned by Waddell in Raritan Bay, New Jersey, not far from the site of the conflict in Arnold v.
Mundy, in an apparent attempt to overturn that decision. Waddell, who traced his title to the
lands to 17th century grants from the King of England to the Duke of York, prevailed in the
lower court, but the Supreme Court reversed in the opinion by Chief Justice Roger Taney
below.]
TANEY, C.J.:
***
The questions before us arise upon an action of ejectment instituted by the defendant in
error, who was the plaintiff in the court below, to recover one hundred acres of land, covered
with water, situated in the Township of Perth Amboy in the State of New Jersey. At the trial in
the circuit court, the jury found a special verdict, setting forth, among other things, that the land
claimed lies beneath the navigable waters of the Raritan River and Bay, where the tide ebbs and
flows. And it appears that the principal matter in dispute is the right to the oyster fishery in the
public rivers and bays of East New Jersey.
The plaintiff makes title under the charters granted by Charles II to his brother, the Duke
of York, in 1664 and 1674, for the purpose of enabling him to plant a colony on this continent.
***
The questions . . . are — Whether the dominion and propriety in the navigable waters,
and in the soils under them, passed, as a part of the prerogative rights annexed to the political
powers conferred on the duke? Whether, in his hands, they were intended to be a trust for the
common use of the new community about to be established or private property to be parceled out
and sold to individuals for his own benefit? And in deciding a question like this, we must not
look merely to the strict technical meaning of the words of the letters patent. The laws and
institutions of England, the history of the times, the object of the charter, the contemporaneous
construction given to it, and the usages under it for the century and more which has since elapsed
are all entitled to consideration and weight. It is not a deed conveying private property, to be
interpreted by the rules applicable to cases of that description. It was an instrument upon which
was to be founded the institutions of a great political community, and in that light it should be
7
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regarded and construed.
Taking this rule for our guide, we can entertain no doubt as to the true construction of
these letters-patent. The object in view appears upon the face of them. They were made for the
purpose of enabling the Duke of York to establish a colony upon the newly discovered continent,
to be governed, as nearly as circumstances would permit, according to the laws and usages of
England, and in which the duke, his heirs and assigns, were to stand in the place of the King, and
administer the government according to the principles of the British Constitution. And the people
who were to plant this colony, and to form the political body over which he was to rule, were
subjects of Great Britain, accustomed to be governed according to its usages and laws.
It is said by Hale, in his treatise de Jure Maris, Harg. Law Tracts 11, when speaking of
the navigable waters, and the sea on the coasts within the jurisdiction of the British Crown,
that although the King is the owner of this great coast, and as a consequent of his
propriety, hath the primary right of fishing in the sea, and creeks and arms thereof, yet the
common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms
thereof as a public common of piscary, and may not, without injury to their right, be
restrained of it unless in such places, creeks or navigable rivers, where either the King or
some particular subject hath gained a propriety exclusive of that common liberty.
The principle here stated by Hale, as to "the public common of piscary" belonging to the
common people of England, is not questioned by any English writer upon that subject. The point
upon which different opinions have been expressed is whether, since Magna Carta, "either the
King or any particular subject can gain a propriety exclusive of the common liberty." For
undoubtedly, rights of fishery, exclusive of the common liberty, are at this day held and enjoyed
by private individuals under ancient grants. But the existence of a doubt as to the right of the
King to make such a grant, after Magna Carta, would of itself show how fixed has been the
policy of that government on this subject for the last six hundred years, and how carefully it has
preserved this common right for the benefit of the public. And there is nothing in the charter
before us indicating that a different and opposite line of policy was designed to be adopted in
that colony. On the contrary, after enumerating in the clause herein before quoted, some of the
prerogative rights annexed to the Crown, but not all of them, general words are used, conveying
"all the estate, right, title, interest, benefit, advantage, claim and demand" of the King, in the
lands and premises before granted. The estate and rights of the King passed to the duke in the
same condition in which they had been held by the Crown, and upon the same trusts. Whatever
was held by the King, as a prerogative right, passed to the duke in the same character. And if the
word "soils" be an appropriate word to pass lands covered with navigable water, as contended for
on the part of the defendant in error, it is associated in the letters patent with "other royalties,"
and conveyed as such. No words are used for the purpose of separating them from the jura
regalia [rights of the monarch — Eds.] and converting them into private property, to be held and
enjoyed by the duke apart from and independent of the political character with which he was
clothed by the same instrument.
Upon a different construction it would have been impossible for him to have complied
with the conditions of the grant. For it was expressly enjoined upon him as a duty in the
government he was about to establish, to make it as near as might be agreeable in their new
8
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circumstances to the laws and statutes of England, and how could this be done if in the charter
itself this high prerogative trust was severed from the regal authority? If the shores and rivers and
bays and arms of the sea and the land under them, instead of being held as a public trust for the
benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation and fishery, as well for
shellfish as floating fish, had been converted by the charter itself into private property, to be
parceled out and sold by the duke for his own individual emolument? There is nothing, we think,
in the terms of the letters patent nor in the purposes for which it was granted that would justify
this construction. And in the judgment of the court, the lands under the navigable waters passed
to the grantee as one of the royalties incident to the powers of government, and were to be held
by him in the same manner and for the same purposes that the navigable waters of England, and
the soils under them, are held by the Crown.
***
[W]hen the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government and took
into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before
belonged either to the Crown or the Parliament became immediately and rightfully vested in the
state.
***
[T]he right now claimed was not seriously asserted on their part before the case of Arnold
v. Mundy, which suit was not instituted until the year 1818; and upon that occasion, the supreme
court of the state held that the claim made by the proprietors was without foundation.
***
The question here depends, not upon the meaning of instruments framed by the people of
New Jersey, or by their authority, but upon charters granted by the British crown; under which
certain rights are claimed by the state, on the one hand, and by private individuals on the other.
And if this court had been of opinion, that upon the face of these letters-patent, the question was
clearly against the state, and that the proprietors had been derived at their just rights, by the
erroneous judgment of the state court [in Arnold v. Mundy]; it would, perhaps, be difficult to
maintain, that this decision, of itself, bound the conscience of this court. It is, however,
unquestionably, entitled to great weight. . . .
Independently, however, of this decision of the supreme court of New Jersey, we are of
opinion that the proprietors are not entitled to the rights in question, and the judgment of the
circuit court must, therefore, be reversed.
[Justice Thompson dissented, complaining that "[a] majority of the court seems to have
adopted the doctrine of Arnold v. Mundy," acknowledging that "title to land under a navigable
stream of water must be held subject to certain public rights," but maintaining that the scope of
those rights — while including navigation and "the right to fish for floating fish" — did not
include the right to harvest shellfish attached to submerged lands.]
Notes
1.

This case involves another dispute over oyster harvesting, perhaps not surprising
9
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in that interstate oyster wars in the 1780s were one of the precipitating events leading to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. See, e.g., DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER
OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 1–7 (2007) (describing a dispute between
Maryland and Virginia over harvesting rights in the Potomac River culminating in an agreement
brokered at George Washington's Mount Vernon estate that declared the river to be a "common
highway" for the citizens of both states); cf., Northwest Ordinance, art. IV, July 13, 1787, 1 Stat.
50, 52 (1789) (“The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Laurence, and the
carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States . . . .”). See generally
BONNIE MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW AND ECOLOGY IN NEW
JERSEY HISTORY (1998).
2.
In Martin, Chief Justice Roger Taney essentially adopted the Arnold v. Mundy
result as the national rule of submerged lands, relying heavily on Sir Matthew Hale. The decision
agreed with Arnold v. Mundy that the state of New Jersey was successor to the English king, and
the king held submerged lands "in his public and regal character, as the representative of the
nation; and in trust for them." Therefore, the landowner, Waddell, could not exclude the
harvester, Martin, just as Robert Arnold could not exclude Benjamin Mundy.
3.
Martin involved a dispute in one of the original thirteen states, which inherited
their sovereignty from Britain. Subsequently admitted states, which generally were federal
territories before becoming states, raised issues of federalism that the Supreme Court addressed
in the following case.
Pollard v. Hagan
Supreme Court of the United States
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)
[Alabama became a state in 1819, from territory that Georgia ceded to the federal
government in 1802. Pollard claimed title to submerged land in Mobile Bay from a federal patent
under an 1836 Act of Congress. Hagan's claim was based on a prior Spanish grant. The trial
court ruled for Hagan, and Pollard appealed.]
MCKINLEY, J.:
***
We think a proper examination of this subject will show, that the United States never held
any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama
or any of the new states were formed; except for temporary purposes, and to execute the trusts
created by the acts of the Virginia and Georgia legislatures, and the deeds of cession executed by
them to the United States, and the trust created by the treaty with the French republic, of the 30th
of April, 1803, ceding Louisiana.
***
Taking the legislative acts of the United States, and the states of Virginia and Georgia,
and their deeds of cession to the United States, and giving to each, separately, and to all jointly, a
10
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fair interpretation, we must come to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties to
invest the United States with the eminent domain of the country ceded, both national and
municipal, for the purposes of temporary government, and to hold it in trust for the performance
of the stipulations and conditions expressed in the deeds of cession and the legislative acts
connected with them. To a correct understanding of the rights, powers, and duties of the parties
to these contracts, it is necessary to enter into a more minute examination of the rights of eminent
domain, and the right to the public lands. When the United States accepted the cession of the
territory, they took upon themselves the trust to hold the municipal eminent domain for the new
states, and to invest them with it, to the same extent, in all respects, that it was held by the states
ceding the territories.
***
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states,
she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia
possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands
remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary
purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing
remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands.
***
We will now inquire into the nature and extent of the right of the United States to these
lands, and whether that right can in any manner affect or control the decision of the case before
us. This right originated in voluntary surrenders, made by several of the old states, of their waste
and unappropriated lands, to the United States, under a resolution of the old Congress, of the 6th
of September, 1780, recommending such surrender and cession, to aid in paying the public debt,
incurred by the war of the Revolution The object of all the parties to these contracts of cession,
was to convert the land into money for the payment of the debt, and to erect new states over the
territory thus ceded; and as soon as these purposes could be accomplished, the power of the
United States over these lands, as property, was to cease.
***
This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the navigable waters, for
all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, and they and they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it. To give to the
United States the right to transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to
the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive the states of the power to exercise a numerous and
important class of police powers. But in the hands of the states this power can never be used so
as to affect the exercise of any national right of eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the
United States have been invested by the Constitution. For, although the territorial limits of
Alabama have extended all her sovereign power into the sea, it is there, as on the shore, but
municipal power, subject to the Constitution of the United States, "and the laws which shall be
made in pursuance thereof."
By the preceding course of reasoning we have arrived at these general conclusions: First.
The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to
11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572802

the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively. Second. The new states have the
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states. Third. The right
of the United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and
regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the
land in controversy in this case.The judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of Alabama is,
therefore, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON dissented [opinion omitted].
Notes
1.
The Pollard Court used the term "eminent domain" to mean the equivalent of
"sovereignty."
2.
In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Spanish land
grantee that was later recognized by the territorial government over a subsequent federal land
grantee. A couple of decades earlier, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the federal grantee over a grantee of Indians. Why doesn't the federal
grantee prevail in this case?
3.
By concluding that the federal government could not transfer title to the shores
and soils under navigable waters to a private citizen, didn't the Court in fact recognize and
impose a trust on the federal government? The federal government held the lands in trust in a
proprietary sense for transfer to the states. But even after such transfer, the federal government
maintained certain interests in the property to protect national concerns. The Court made clear,
"But in the hands of the states this power can never be used so as to affect the exercise of any
national right . . . ." Doesn't the public trust encumber the federal government in carrying out
such national interests?
4.
Although the Pollard opinion suggests that the federal government would not
retain and manage federal lands in new states, that has not proved to be the case. See 1 GEORGE
C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ch. 1–2 (2d ed. 2014)
(explaining how and why the federal government retains roughly thirty percent of the land
ownership of the United States). In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), the Supreme
Court limited Pollard to its facts and ruled that the federal government, not the individual coastal
states, owned the submerged lands off the coasts of the United States. However, the states turned
to Congress, which in 1953 passed the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1356a, which
conveyed to the coastal states title to lands submerged by coastal waters within three miles
offshore (three marine leagues in the case of Texas and Florida). The federal government
retained ownership of the remaining offshore, now called the outer continental shelf.
5.
Despite state ownership of the beds of navigable waters at statehood, the federal
government may claim ownership of the overlying waters to carry out the purposes of federal
land reservations under the reserved water rights doctrine. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
596–97 (1963) (holding that the Pollard rule applied only to the ownership of submerged lands,
not to other federal lands or the water flowing through them); see generally 2 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, ch. 37 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3rd ed. 2014) (explaining the reserved rights
doctrine in detail).
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6.
Professor Robert Emmet Clark once succinctly described the Pollard rule that
awarded newly admitted states only the beds of navigable waters while leaving the remaining
public lands in the hands of the federal government as "ridiculous, but true." 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 251 (1967).
7.
The Pollard decision awarded to newly admitted states the beds of navigable
waters to put them on an "equal footing" with the original states. States have equal representation
in the U.S. Senate, but they are hardly equal in the House of Representatives. They also are equal
in ownership of lands submerged beneath navigable waters. Nevertheless, the question of what
constitutes a "navigable water" is one of the more complex issues in natural resources law. We
take up the navigability concept and its implications in chapter 3.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois
Supreme Court of the United States
146 U.S. 387 (1892)
[In 1869, the Illinois legislature passed a statute granting "all the right and title" of one
square mile of submerged lands in Lake Michigan to Illinois Central Railroad to construct
wharves, piers, docks, and other facilities in Chicago harbor. In 1873, the legislature repealed the
statute and revoked the grant. Ten years later, in 1883, the state attorney general filed suit against
the railroad, alleging that the railroad's construction of improvements in Chicago harbor was on
submerged lands owned by the state. The railroad defended on the ground that the grant in the
1869 act was valid. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1892, producing the following
opinion.]
FIELD, J.:
***
The act, if valid and operative to the extent claimed, placed under the control of the
railroad company nearly the whole of the submerged lands of the harbor, subject only to the
limitations that it should not authorize obstructions to the harbor, or impair the public right of
navigation, or exclude the legislature from regulating the rates of wharfage or dockage to be
charged. With these limitations, the act put it in the power of the company to delay indefinitely
the improvement of the harbor, or to construct as many docks, piers, and wharves and other
works as it might choose, and at such positions in the harbor as might suit its purposes, and
permit any kind of business to be conducted thereon, and to lease them out on its own terms for
indefinite periods. The inhibition against the technical transfer of the fee of any portion of the
submerged lands was of little consequence when it could make lease for any period, and renew it
at its pleasure; and the inhibitions against authorizing obstructions to the harbor and impairing
the public right of navigation placed no impediments upon the action of the railroad company
which did not previously exist. A corporation created for one purpose, the construction and
operation of a railroad between designated points, is by the act converted into a corporation to
manage and practically control the harbor of Chicago, not simply for its own purpose as a
railroad corporation, but for its own profit generally.
The circumstances attending the passage of the act through the legislature were on the
hearing the subject of much criticism. As originally introduced, the purpose of the act was to
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enable the city of Chicago to enlarge its harbor, and to grant to it the title and interest of the state
to certain lands adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan, on the eastern front of the city, and place
the harbor under its control; giving it all the necessary powers for its wise management. But
during the passage of the act its purport was changed. Instead of providing for the cession of the
submerged lands to the city, it provided for a cession of them to the railroad company. It was
urged that the title of the act was not changed to correspond with its changed purpose, and an
objection was taken to its validity on that account. But the majority of the court were of opinion
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the requirement of the constitution of the state, in
its passage, was not complied with.
The question, therefore, to be considered, is whether the legislature was competent to
thus deprive the state of its ownership of the submerged lands in the harbor of Chicago, and of
the consequent control of its waters; or, in other words, whether the railroad corporation can hold
the lands and control the waters by the grant, against any future exercise of power over them by
the state.
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan,
within its limits, in the same manner that the state hold title to soils under tide water . . . we have
already shown; and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters above them,
whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from that which the
state holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in
the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of
the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties. The
interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be
improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which
purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is
made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. . . .
But that is a very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the abdication of
the general control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay,
or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires
the government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the public. The trust devolving
upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control
of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the
property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. . . .
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to
be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not
absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation. The state can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so
as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of
parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels
can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate
its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace. In the
administration of government the use of such powers may for a limited period be delegated to a
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municipality or other body, but there always remains with the state the right to revoke those
powers and exercise them in a more direct manner, and one more conformable to its wishes. So
with trusts connected with public property, or property of a special character, like lands under
navigable waters; they cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction and control of the state.
The harbor of Chicago is of immense value to the people of the state of Illinois, in the
facilities it affords to its vast and constantly increasing commerce; and the idea that its legislature
can deprive the state of control over its bed and waters, and place the same in the hands of a
private corporation, created for a different purpose, — one limited to transportation of
passengers and freight between distant points and the city, — is a proposition that cannot be
defended.
The area of the submerged lands proposed to be ceded by the act in question to the
railroad company embraces something more than 1,000 acres, being, as stated by counsel, more
than three times the area of the outer harbor, and not only including all of that harbor, but
embracing—adjoining submerged lands, which will, in all probability, be hereafter included in
the harbor. It is as large as that embraced by all the merchandise docks along the Thames at
London; is much larger than that included in the famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is twice
that of the port of Marseilles, and nearly, if not quite, equal to the pier area along the waterfront
of the city of New York. And the arrivals and clearings of vessels at the port exceed in number
those of New York, and are equal to those of New York and Boston combined. Chicago has
nearly 25 percent of the lake carrying trade, as compared with the arrivals and clearings of all the
leading ports of our great inland seas. In the year ending June 30, 1886, the joint arrivals and
clearances of vessels at that port amounted to 22,096, with a tonnage of over 7,000,000; and in
1890 the tonnage of the vessels reached nearly 9,000,000. As stated by counsel, since the
passage of the lake front act, in 1869, the population of the city has increased nearly 1,000,000
souls, and the increase of commerce has kept pace with it. It is hardly conceivable that the
legislature can divest the state of the control and management of this harbor, and vest it
absolutely in a private Corporation. Surely an act of the legislature transferring the title to its
submerged lands and the power claimed by the railroad company to a foreign state or nation
would be repudiated, without hesitation, as a gross perversion of the trust over the property under
which it is held. So would a similar transfer to a corporation of another state. It would not be
listened to that the control and management of the harbor of that great city — a subject of
concern to the whole people of the state — should thus be placed elsewhere than in the state
itself. All the objections which can be urged to such attempted transfer may be urged to a transfer
to a private corporation like the railroad company in this case.
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the
property was held by the state can be resumed at any time. Undoubtedly there may be expenses
incurred in improvements made under such a grant, which the state ought to pay; but, be that as it
may, the power to resume the trust whenever the state judges best is, we think, incontrovertible.
The position advanced by the railroad company in support of its claim to the ownership of the
submerged lands, and the right to the erection of wharves, piers, and docks at its pleasure, or for
its business in the harbor of Chicago, would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a
majority of the legislature of the state in which the harbor is situated.
We cannot, it is true, cite any authority where a grant of this kind has been held invalid,
for we believe that no instance exists where the harbor of a great city and its commerce have
been allowed to pass into the control of any private corporation. But the decisions are numerous
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which declare that such property is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the
public. The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor, and of the lands under them, is a
subject of public concern to the whole people of the state. The trust with which they are held,
therefore, is governmental, and cannot be alienated, except in those instances mentioned, of
parcels used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of
without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
This follows necessarily from the public character of the property, being held by the
whole people for purposes in which the whole people are interested. . . .
In Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, it appeared that by an act passed by the
legislature of Ohio, in 1846, it was provided that upon the fulfillment of certain conditions by the
proprietors or citizens of the town of Canfield, the county seat should be permanently established
in that town. Those conditions having been complied with, the county seat was established
therein accordingly. In 1874 the legislature passed an act for the removal of the county seat to
another town. Certain citizens of Canfield thereupon filed their bill, setting forth the act of 1846,
and claiming that the proceedings constituted an executed contract, and prayed for an injunction
against the contemplated removal. But the court refused the injunction, holding that there could
be no contract and no irrepealable law upon governmental subjects, observing that legislative
acts concerning public interests are necessarily public laws; that every succeeding legislature
possesses the same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have the same power
of repeal and modification which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less; that all
occupy in this respect a footing of perfect equality; that this is necessarily so in the nature of
things; that it is vital to the public welfare that each one should be able, at all times, to do
whatever the varying circumstances and present exigencies attending the subject may require;
and that a different result would be fraught with evil.
As counsel observe, if this is true doctrine as to the location of a county seat it is apparent
that it must apply with greater force to the control of the soils and beds of navigable waters in the
great public harbors held by the people in trust for their common use and of common right as an
incident to their sovereignty. The legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its
successors in respect to matters, the government of which, from the very nature of things, must
vary with varying circumstances. The legislation which may be needed one day for the harbor
may be different from the legislation that may be required at another day. Every legislature must,
at the time of its existence, exercise the power of the State in the execution of the trust devolved
upon it. We hold, therefore, that any attempted cession of the ownership and control of the State
in and over the submerged lands in Lake Michigan, by the act of April 16, 1869, was inoperative
to affect, modify or in any respect to control the sovereignty and dominion of the State over the
lands, or its ownership thereof, and that any such attempted operation of the act was annulled by
the repealing act of April 15, 1873, which to that extent was valid and effective. There can be no
irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust,
under which he was bound to hold and manage it.
***
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, [with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE
BROWN] dissenting.
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***
[We agree that the State cannot part,] by contract, with her sovereign powers. The
railroad company takes and holds these lands subject at all times to the same sovereign powers in
the state as obtain in the case of other owners of property. Nor can the grant in this case be
regarded as in any way hostile to the powers of the general government in the control of harbors
and navigable waters.
The able and interesting statement, in the opinion of the majority, of the rights of the
public in the navigable waters, and of the limitation of the powers of the state to part with its
control over them, is not dissented from. But its pertinency in the present discussion is not
clearly seen. It will be time enough to invoke the doctrine of the inviolability of public rights
when and if the railroad company shall attempt to disregard them.
Should the state of Illinois see in the great and unforeseen growth of the city of Chicago
and of the lake commerce reason to doubt the prudence of her legislature in entering into the
contract created by the passage and acceptance of the act of 1869, she can take the rights and
property of the railroad company in these lands by a constitutional condemnation of them. So,
freed from the shackles of an undesirable contract, she can make, as she expresses in her bill a
desire to do, a "more advantageous sale or disposition to other parties," without offense to the
law of the land.
***
Notes
1.
The Illinois Central decision was 4–3, with Chief Justice Melvin Fuller recusing
himself because, as a counsel to the City of Chicago before his appointment to the Supreme
Court, he headed a consortium that also sought to develop the city's outer harbor as a competitor
to the railroad. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 799 (2004)
(noting that downstate legislators favored the grant to the railroad because its operations were
subject to a seven percent gross receipts tax, but acknowledging the weight of evidence suggests
some bribery of legislators).
2.
Although not the first U.S. judicial pronouncement on the public trust, Illiniois
Central is widely considered to be the lodestar decision of the field. Particularly important is the
Court's view of the public trust as setting limits on legislative sovereignty. Note that the Court
emphasized that all legislatures "occupy . . . a footing of perfect equality," and that "[t]he
legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its successors in respect to matters, the
government of which, from the very nature of things, must vary with varying circumstances."
Note the Court’s reliance on Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548 (1879) (concerning the
location of a county seat in Ohio), for this proposition of temporal equal footing of legislatures.
Isn’t this another way of saying that sovereign power is limited by a concern for future
generations?
One of the deeper interpretations of Illinois Central was offered by Professor Douglas
Grant, who surmised that the origins of the PTD as expressed by Justice Field lie in the federal
constitutional reserved power doctrine. Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust
Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central Railroad, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 849 (2001). That doctrine first
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emerged in an early body of jurisprudence geared toward defining basic duties of government. It
allows a legislature to repudiate contracts bargaining away or limiting essential sovereign
powers. The Newton v. Commissioners case, discussed above, was in that doctrinal lineage.
As Professor Grant explained, the reserved powers doctrine makes clear that essential
sovereign powers are implicitly reserved to the legislature in perpetuity, and are inalienable such
that they could “‘neither be abdicated nor bargained away . . . even by express grant.'" Id. at 856
(citing Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914)). This principle prevents
one legislature from taking actions that would compromise a future legislature’s ability to
exercise sovereignty on behalf of its citizens. Because of the crucial public character of
submerged lands — described as a “subject of concern to the whole people” — these lands were
clothed with sovereign interests and could not be conveyed away by any one legislature under
the reserved powers doctrine. Isn’t this interpretation consistent with Justice Field’s words, “[a]
grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within
the legislative power . . . ."? Allowing one legislature to privatize submerged lands, Justice Field
admonished, "would place every harbor in the country at the mercy of a majority of the
legislature of the state in which the harbor is situated." Isn’t this tantamount to saying that the
public trust doctrine imposes inherent limits on sovereignty?
3.
The source of Justice Field's decision has mystified many scholars. He relied on
no state law, leaving the implication that the public trust is of federal origin. See Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust, at 454 (p. _) (noting that Illinois Central "seems
plainly to have been premised on federal law"). Ensuing Supreme Court decisions, such as
Shively v. Bowlby (p. 77) and Appleby v. New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926), have assumed that the
doctrine is grounded in state law, but the vast majority of state court interpretations of Illinois
Central consider it to be binding authority. See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public
Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 Hastings W-Nw. J.
Envtl. L & Pol'y 113, 151–53 (2010) (of 35 state courts relying on Illinois Central, 29 of them
treat it as controlling). In addition to the reserved powers basis explained above, other federal
sources of authority include federal common law, see id. at 141–43; the equal protection clause,
see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. 411, 422–28 (1987) (explaining that
"[w]hen property is conveyed out of public trust for inadequate consideration, some citizens
receive disproportionate benefits, while others receive disproportionate losses"); or the
commerce clause, as suggested by Professor Wilkinson in his Headwaters article (p. 41).
At least as it applies to submerged lands, many have associated the public trust doctrine
with Pollard v. Hagan's equal footing doctrine, under which the federal government implicitly
conveyed to states the ownership of the beds of navigable waters in statehood acts. The equal
footing doctrine is constitutionally grounded on the language authorizing new states "into this
Union." Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (striking down a provision of the Oklahoma
statehood act limiting the state's ability to move its capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City as
violative of equal footing). The implicit conveyance of equal footing lands to the states came
with public trust conditions attached, an argument propounded by Professor Wilkinson's article
(p. 41). Also noting the close connection of the equal footing and public trust doctrines are James
R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust
Doctrines, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 1 (1997); and Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A
Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 Envtl. L. 515, 524 (1989). Are these
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separate doctrines, or is one a subset of the other?
Or does the public trust doctrine inhere solely in the equal footing grants to the states?
Would such an interpretation explain the expansion of the PTD to include resources beyond
traditionally navigable waters and to serve purposes other than navigation and fishing? If the
trust originates as an inherent limit on legislative power, does that explain why the submerged
lands conveyed by the equal footing doctrine carry a trust restriction against privatization? Does
this interpretation also underscore the PTD as an attribute of sovereignty compatible with the
doctrine's manifestation in other countries, such as the case law discussed in chapter 10?
4.
Was the result of the decision that the state could not privatize the harbor, or was
it that the state could revoke the grant it made earlier without compensation? In other words, was
the grant void as beyond the state's sovereign authority, or was it voidable by a subsequent
legislature? The Court's opinion suggests both possibilities. There is a difference: the former
imposes a limit on sovereign authority; the latter enables the state to take action to rescind
unwise grants. The two need not be exclusive if the latter is viewed as a remedy for a grant
exceeding legislative authority.
5.
Notice that the three-member dissent authored by Justice Shiras did not question
"the rights of the public in the navigable waters, and of the limitation of the powers of the state to
part with its control over them." But the dissent maintained that there was no ripe controversy
and apparently thought the state's means of using its retained sovereign control was through to "a
constitutional condemnation." But isn’t there a difference between a condemnation and
revocation of a grant on the basis that it was invalid? Doesn't it come down to whether the
private grantee deserves compensation? Justice Field's opinion clearly indicates that the original
title was invalid to begin with, thus giving no basis for compensation. Professor Rasband,
interpreting Justice Field's suggestion that the state should pay compensation for taking
improvements undertaken by Illinois Central, has propounded a theory that all state assertions of
the public trust doctrine should be accompanyed by what he calls "equitable compensation." See
James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331
(1998) (calling for compensation under either a mistaken improver theory or a thorough revision
of the public trust doctrine). Would this vitiate the force of the public trust doctrine as a check
against privatization?
6.
What is distinctive about submerged lands warranting public trust protection? Did
Justice Field announce any tests? Can you find a "public concern" test emerging from the
descriptions of streambeds as property which “is a subject of public concern to the whole people
of the state” and "property of a special character"? Did Justice Field indicate that the trust
includes only submersible lands and waters above them, or was it more inclusive? Are other
resources, such as groundwater and atmosphere, subject to equivalent (or even greater) public
concern today? Does the rationale of Illinois Central reach to those resources? Note that the
traditional focus of the trust was for fishing, navigation and commerce, but cases have expanded
the interests protected by the trust to include such matters as recreation and aesthetics, as later
chapters will show.
7.
Note that the prohibition on conveying streambeds is not absolute. Justice Field
created two exceptions, which modern courts apply. One is conveyance of "such parcels as are
used in promoting the interests of the public therein" and the other is conveyance of parcels that
"can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining." One persistent question has to do with changed uses on these parcels over
19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572802

time. What if a parcel is conveyed under one of these two exceptions, but the use later changes
so as to undermine the public interest or to cause substantial impairment?
8.
Justice Field's majority opinion is perhaps best interpreted as anti-monopolistic,
refusing to allow the legislature to authorize a private railroad to control Chicago's harbor. But
the evidence suggests that the grant to the railroad would have only supplemented existing
facilities by creating a new "outer harbor," making the railroad the largest operator in Chicago
harbor but not the only one. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 302 (2d ed. 2012) (suggesting that although he was an ardent freemarket advocate, Justice Field was opposed to special privileges for corporations). The outer
harbor contemplated in the grant to the railroad was never built. Today, the only commercial
facility of any significance in Chicago harbor is Navy Pier, now a popular tourist attraction. Id. at
322.
9.
Stephen J. Field, who was appointed by Abraham Lincoln, served on the Court for
thirty-four years (1863–1897), breaking Chief Justice John Marshall's record for longevity. As a
westerner from California, he wrote many influential public lands decisions and was also
influential in the Court's adoption of the doctrine of substantive due process to reign in state
police powers, which might help explain his unwillingness to rely on the state's police power to
regulate the railroad in Illinois Central. His reasoning in dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36 (1872), and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), eventually became majority
opinions after he left the Court in decisions like Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10.
Progeny of Illinois Central have invalidated other grants of Lake Michigan
submerged lands. See People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976)
(striking down a grant of 194 acres of submerged lands to U.S. Steel for a proposed mill); Lake
Michigan Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F.Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(striking down a conveyance of 18 acres to Loyola University). See also Center for Law in the
Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that the state could not,
consistent with the public trust doctrine and the state constitution's gift clause, convey the beds
of navigable waters to private landowners); Lawrence v. Clark County, 254 P.3d 606 (Nev.
2011) (applying the public trust doctrine to limit the state legislature's ability to alienate trust
lands, including the now-dry riverbed and banks of the historic Colorado River).
One of the most significant modern decisions in the lineage of Illinois Central is Lake
Michigan Federation, cited above. In that case, the federal district court of Illinois invalidated a
legislative grant of part of the shoreline of Lake Michigan to Loyola University (a private
educational non-profit corporation) and enjoined Loyola's planned fill of the shoreline.
Interestingly, while the environmental plaintiffs asserted two claims, one based on the public
trust, and one based on a wetlands permit requirement in the Clean Water Act, the court chose to
base its decision solely on the broader public trust claim. Loyola planned to expand its campus
by filling 18.5 acres of Lake Michigan. The plans called for construction of bike and walking
paths, and other areas that the public could use in unrestricted manner. Some of the land was to
be used for athletic facilities that the public could access subject to Loyola's ownership rights.
While the legislature had acknowledged that it held the lands in trust for the public, it
nonetheless conveyed them to Loyola reasoning that the public would benefit from the lakefill
and planned development. Squarely holding the conveyance invalid under the Illinois Central
precedent, the federal court summarized the public trust obligation as follows:
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Three basic principles can be distilled from [the] body of public trust case law.
First, courts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender valuable public
resources to a private entity. Second, the public trust is violated when the primary
purpose of a legislative grant is to benefit a private interest. Finally, any attempt by the
state to relinquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated under the
doctrine.
Applying these criteria to the legislative grant of the lakebed to Loyola, it is
apparent that the transfer violates the public trust doctrine. First, while the project has
some aspects which are beneficial to the public, the primary purpose of the grant is to
satisfy a private interest. Loyola sought and received the grant in order to satisfy its desire
for a larger campus. [The] inescapable truth is that the lakebed property will be sacrificed
to satisfy Loyola's private needs. Under the public trust doctrine, such a sacrifice cannot
be tolerated.
Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
The court's ruling is notable because of its requirement that a grant not be made for the
"primary purpose" of satisfying a private interest, however laudable that interest might be (such
as education). Recognizing that nearly all grants could be justified by a combination of public
and private interests, the court refused to defer to the legislature's determination that this grant
would be for public benefit. Its language reflects the same suspicion of legislative intent that
characterized the Illinois Central opinion and is relevant to any inquiry into the separation of
powers between the legislature and courts in determining the scope of the public trust:
Loyola also argues that we should be deferent to the Illinois legislature's
determination that the grant at issue did not violate the public trust. In both the debate
before the law was passed and in the legislation itself, the legislature acknowledged that
it held the lakebed in trust for the public and declared that the grant would not violate this
trust because of the project's numerous public benefits. According to Loyola, we should
yield to this specific legislative consideration of public interest.
However, this claim is incorrect both as a matter of logic and precedent. The very
purpose of the public trust doctrine is to police the legislature's disposition of public
lands. If courts were to rubber stamp legislative decisions, as Loyola advocates, the
doctrine would have no teeth. The legislature would have unfettered discretion to breach
the public trust as long as it was able to articulate some gain to the public. Moreover,
Illinois courts have acknowledged that courts are not encumbered by legislative
expressions of public interest. Therefore, we find that the legislative determination that
the lakefill would serve the public is no obstacle to our conclusion that the grant was in
breach of the public trust.
***
What we have here is a transparent giveaway of public property to a private
entity. The lakebed of Lake Michigan is held in trust for and belongs to the citizenry of
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the state. The conveyance of lakebed property to a private party–no matter how reputable
and highly motivated that private party may be — violates this public trust doctrine.
Id. at 446–47 (citations omitted).
11.
At various times, legislatures have tried to restrict the public trust through statute,
thus testing the constitutional force of the doctrine. In Arizona, the legislature passed a statute
relinquishing the state's interest in nearly all of the state's watercourses, which the Arizona Court
of Appeals invalidated in Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, cited above,
on grounds that both the public trust doctrine and the gift clause in the state’s constitution
limited conveyances of public property. Relying on Illinois Central to determine the limits of
state legislative power and emphasizing the role of the judiciary in the constitutional separation
of powers, the court stated:
From Illinois Central, we derive the proposition that the state's responsibility to
administer its watercourse lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of
statehood itself.
***
The second grounding for an Arizona law of public trust lies in our constitutional
commitment to the checks and balances of a government of divided powers.
***
Judicial review of public trust dispensations complements the concept of a public
trust. Our supreme court said in reviewing a disposition of mineral deposits on school
trust lands, "The duties imposed upon the state [are] the duties of a trustee and not simply
the duties of a good business manager." Just as private trustees are judicially accountable
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches
are judicially accountable for their dispositions of the public trust. The beneficiaries of
the public trust are not just present generations but those to come. The check and balance
of judicial review provides a level of protection against improvident dissipation of an
irreplaceable res.
Id. at 168–69 (citations omitted).
The Hassel decision led to a series of legislative attempts to eliminate the public trust
doctrine, all invalidated by the judiciary, which construed the trust doctrine as an inherent
constitutional limit of sovereignty. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel.
County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) ( concluding that legislation that eliminated
the public trust doctrine from consideration in water rights adjudications was unconsitutitional
because, "[t]he public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give
away resources held by the state in trust for its people."); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d
722 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a statute forfeiting state's interest in certain watercourses
was unconstitutional under the public trust doctrine and the gift clause). For an analysis of the
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Arizona public trust doctrine, see Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Arizona's Streambeds, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1053, 1058 (1996).
Shively v. Bowlby
Supreme Court of the United States
152 U.S. 1 (1894)
[In 1854, John Shively recorded a land claim in the town of Astoria, including tidelands
in the Columbia River, under a federal statute applicable to the Oregon Territory. In 1876, after
statehood, the state conveyed to John Bowlby the same tidelands. Bowlby filed suit, claiming
that the federal pre-statehood grant passed no title to Shively below the high water mark. Bowlby
prevailed in state courts, and Shively appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.]
GRAY, J.:
I. By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms
of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high water mark, within the
jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King. Such waters, and the lands which they
cover, either at all times or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private
occupation, cultivation, and improvement, and their natural and primary uses are public in their
nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of
fishing by all the King's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and
unoccupied lands, belongs to the King, as the sovereign, and the dominion thereof, jus publicum,
is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.
The great authority in the law of England upon this subject is Lord Chief Justice Hale,
whose authorship of the treatise De Jure Maris, sometimes questioned, has been put beyond
doubt by recent researches. Moore on the Foreshore (3d ed.) 318, 370, 413. [The Court
interpreted Lord Hale to recognize that the King owned tidal waters and the right of fishing
therein, but “the common people [have] a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms thereof,
as a public common of piscary . . . .” The opinion proceeded to cite Martin v. Waddell and its
reliance on Arnold v. Mundy for the proposition that King’s sovereign and proprietary rights in
navigable waters passed in “trust for the common use of the . . . community” to the states, “to be
freely used by all for navigation and fishery . . . not as private property to be parceled out and
sold . . . .”]
***
III. The governments of the several colonies, with a view to induce persons to erect
wharves for the benefit of navigation and commerce, early allowed to the owners of lands
bounding on tidewaters greater rights and privileges in the shore, below high-water mark, than
they had in England; but the nature and degree of such rights and privileges differed in the
different colonies, and in some were created by statute, while in others they rested upon usage
only.
***
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The foregoing summary of the laws of the original states shows that there is no universal
and uniform law upon the subject, but that each state has dealt with the lands under the
tidewaters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own
control over such lands or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners
of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution
therefore is necessary in applying precedents in one state to cases arising in another.
***
As has been seen, by the law of England, the title in fee, or jus privatum, of the king or
his grantee, was, in the phrase of Lord Hale, “charged with and subject to that jus publicum
which belongs to the king's subjects,” or, as he elsewhere puts it, “is clothed and superinduced
with a jus publicum, wherein both natives and foreigners in peace with this kingdom are
interested by reason of common commerce, trade, and intercourse.” Harg. Law Tracts, 36, 84. In
the words of Chief Justice Taney, “the country” discovered and settled by Englishmen “was held
by the king, in his public and regal character, as the representative of the nation, and in trust for
them;” and the title and the dominion of the tide waters, and of the soil under them, in each
colony, passed by the royal charter to the grantees as “a trust for the common use of the new
community about to be established,” and, upon the American Revolution, vested absolutely in
the people of each state, “for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the constitution to the general government.” Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 16 Pet. 367, 409–11.
As observed by Mr. Justice Curtis, “This soil is held by the state, not only subject to, but in some
sense in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public rights.” Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74.
“The title to the shore and lands under tide water,” said Mr. Justice Bradley, “is regarded as
incidental to the sovereignty of the state, a portion of the royalties belonging thereto, and held in
trust for the public purposes of navigation and fishery.” Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381.
And the territories acquired by congress, whether by deed of cession from the original states, or
by treaty with a foreign country, are held with the object, as soon as their population and
condition justify it, of being admitted into the Union as states, upon an equal footing with the
original states in all respects; and the title and dominion of the tide waters, and the lands under
them, are held by the United States for the benefit of the whole people, and, as this court has
often said, in cases above cited, “in trust for the future states.” Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3
How. 212, 221, 222; Weber v. Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57, 65; Knight v. Association, 142 U.S.
161, 183.
***
The [Oregon Supreme Court] thus stated its final conclusion:
From all this, it appears that when the State of Oregon was admitted into the union, the
tidelands became its property, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal; that in the
absence of legislation or usage, the common law rule would govern the rights of the
upland proprietor, and by that law the title to them is in the state; that the state has the
right to dispose of them in such manner as she might deem proper, as is frequently done
in various ways, and whereby sometimes large areas are reclaimed and occupied by cities
and are put to public and private uses, state control and ownership therein being supreme,
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subject only to the paramount right of navigation and commerce. The whole question is
for the state to determine for itself. It can say to what extent it will preserve its rights of
ownership in them or confer them on others. Our state has done that by the legislation
already referred to, and our courts have declared its absolute property in and dominion
over the tidelands and its right to dispose of its title in such manner as it might deem best,
unaffected by any ‘legal obligation to recognize the rights of either the riparian owners,
or those who had occupied such tidelands' other than it chose to resign to them, subject
only to the paramount right of navigation and the uses of commerce. From these
considerations it results, if we are to be bound by the previous adjudications of this Court,
which have become a rule of property, and upon the faith of which important rights and
titles have become vested, and large expenditures have been made and incurred, that the
defendants have no rights or interests in the lands in question.
***
The conclusions from the considerations and authorities above stated may be summed up
as follows:
[1.] Lands under tidewaters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner of
lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is
incidental or subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.
[2.] At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the
King for the benefit of the nation. Upon the settlement of the colonies, like rights passed to the
grantees in the royal charters, in trust for the communities to be established. Upon the American
Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust, were vested in the original states within their
respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United States.
[3.] Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, whether by cession from one
of the states, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title
and dominion passed to the United States for the benefit of the whole people and in trust for the
several states to be ultimately created out of the territory.
The new states admitted into the union since the adoption of the Constitution have the
same rights as the original states in the tidewaters and in the lands under them, within their
respective jurisdictions. The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below
high water mark therefore are governed by the laws of the several states, subject to the rights
granted to the United States by the Constitution.
[4.] The United States, while they hold the country as a territory, having all the powers
both of national and of municipal government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or
rights in the soil below high water mark of tidewaters. But they have never done so by general
laws, and, unless in some case of international duty or public exigency, have acted upon the
policy, as most in accordance with the interest of the people and with the object for which the
territories were acquired, of leaving the administration and disposition of the sovereign rights in
25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572802

navigable waters and in the soil under them to the control of the states, respectively, when
organized and admitted into the Union.
Grants by Congress of portions of the public lands within a territory to settlers thereon,
though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters convey, of their own force no title or right
below high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion of the future state, when
created, but leave the question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign
control of each state, subject only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States.
The donation land claim, bounded by the Columbia River, upon which the plaintiff in
error relies includes no title or right in the land below high water mark, and the statutes of
Oregon under which the defendants in error hold are a constitutional and legal exercise by the
State of Oregon of its dominion over the lands under navigable waters. [Consequently, the
Supreme Court affirmed the state court decision in favor of the state grantee.]
Notes
1.
In Shively, the Court had to interpret the scope of a federal land grant under the
Oregon Donation Act of 1850, a predecessor to the federal Homestead Act of 1862. Shively
staked his claim to both uplands and submerged lands in 1854, when Oregon was still a federal
territory. Pre-statehood grants of submerged lands could defeat a state's equal footing lands
recognized in Pollard v. Hagan (p. 65). How does the Court interpret the scope of the grant
under the 1850 Act?
2.
The Court suggests that pre-statehood federal grants could be upheld in the case
of "international duty" or "public exigency." Some pre-statehood conveyances have been upheld
if they meet the Supreme Court's standard of clearly expressed intention. See, e.g., Utah Div. of
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987) (concluding that two pre-statehood statutes did
not meet this standard); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997) (deciding that a Department
of Interior withdrawal of lands to create the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge included submerged
lands, preventing them from passing to the state at statehood); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S.
262 (2001) (ruling that an Indian reservation that included part of Lake Coeur d'Alene met the
standard).
3.
Shively is sometimes cited as precedent for the proposition that the public trust
doctrine has its roots in state, not federal law. Is this accurate? Doesn't it have its roots in the
national law of England? Like the decision in Arnold v. Mundy, this one clearly articulates the
origin of the doctrine as tracing to English law (noting that the jus publicum vested in the King
"as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit"). It then shows the lineage of the
doctrine in the United States, applying initially to the colonies, then to the states and to the
federal government when it held land in trust for the states. Given this origin, wouldn’t it be
more appropriate to call this trust a "sovereign" doctrine rather than a "state" doctrine? Does the
public trust arise under federal law or state law, or both? Is it significant that two of the landmark
public trust opinions came from the U.S. Supreme Court (Shively v. Bowlby and Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois)? Did these opinions just apply the law of the involved states, or did they
apply a general doctrine that became, as a matter of federal law, reflected in those states as an
attribute of sovereignty?
4.
Notice that the Court distinguished the jus privatum from the jus publicum in
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tidelands and relied heavily on Sir Matthew Hale's treatise. Hale's book, DE JURE MARIS,
discussed earlier (p. __), was written in 1660s but not published until 1786, explained the
public's "liberty of fishing" which could be displaced "where the King has gained a propriety
exclusive of that common liberty." Otherwise, there was a prima facie right in the King for the
common good.
5.
Two years after Shively, the Court again applied trust principles in articulating the
concept of state sovereign ownership of wildlife. In Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529
(1896) (p. 199), the Court stated that "the power or control [over wildlife] lodged in the State,
resulting from this ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust
for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as
distinct from the people, or the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public
good." Thus, within four years the Supreme Court found trust principles to govern cases
involving ownership of the beds of inland navigable waters and coastal tidal waters as well as
wildlife.
***
The previous foundational cases were all decided in the 19th century. In December, 2013,
public trust jurisprudence took an extraordinary leap forward when Chief Justice Ronald Castille
of the Supreme Court of Pennsyslvania articulated foundational principles that articulated the
sovereign constitutional basis of the trust and explained the fiduciary duties of the legislature. In
a pioneering opinion that represents the most modern comprehensive judicial treatment of the
trust, the Court struck down as unconstitutional, a statute passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature
in 2012 to promote natural gas extraction and “fracking.”
The enacted amendments to the Oil and Gas Act (“Act 13”) addressed the permitting,
funding and fee collection for unconventional gas wells in the Marcellus Shale, a natural gas
reservoir beneath the state’s surface. Extraction techniques include hydraulic fracturing or slickwater “fracking.” Fracking is a highly controversial process because of its environmental
hazards and adverse effects on nearby property owners. It involves pumping a mixture of sand,
water, and chemicals at high pressure into the rock until the rock breaks, releasing the gas. Each
well uses several million gallons of water. Act 13, described by the court as a statute designed to
create a “maximally favorable environment” for the natural gas industry to exploit
Pennsylvania’s resources, prohibited any local regulation of oil and gas operations and required
statewide uniformity in local zoning of oil and gas resources. The Act also included waivers of
mandatory setbacks, which would have separated gas wells from sensitive water sources.
Citizens and local governments sued the state (“Commonwealth”), seeking an injunction
prohibiting the application of Act 13. They argued that the statute violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which includes an Environmental Rights Amendment (Article 1, Section 27) that
sets forth public trust duties. The lower court (the Commonwealth Court) found the statute
unconstitutional in part, but rejected the citizens’ claims that Act 13 violated the Environmental
Rights Amendment. On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that Act 13 violated
the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court first addressed the issues of standing and justiciability,
finding in favor of the citizen plaintiffs on both questions. It specifically rejected the argument
that the litigation posed a political question inappropriate for judicial resolution. The Chief
Justice then wrote a plurality opinion, joined by two other justices, expounding on the public
trust doctrine and holding that Act 13 violated the Environmental Rights Amendment. A fourth
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justice, Justice Baer, expressed no disagreement with Justice Castille’s lead opinion, but wrote
separately because he determined that Act 13 violated the state’s constitutional due process
protection of private property.
Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
83 A.3d 901 (2013)
[Act 13 was, according to the state, an exercise of its police powers as a “comprehensive
reform of the oil and gas laws” of the state in order to promote the development of its “vast
natural gas reserves . . . ,” while creating jobs and energy self-sufficiency, providing “impact
fees” to local governments where drilling occurs, ensuring uniformity of local zoning ordinances,
and “updating” the state’s environmental regulation of the oil and gas industry. Amici business
groups emphasized that the Marcellis Shale deposit holds “trillions of cubic feet of natural gas,”
with the capability of meeting present and future demands for natural gas at affordable prices.
Robinson Township and the citizens alleged that Act 13 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution,
particularly its Environmental Rights Amendment.]
CASTILLE, C.J.:
***
3. The Applicable Constitutional Paradigm
The General Assembly derives its power from the Pennsylvania Constitution in Article
III, Sections 1 through 27. The Constitution grants the General Assembly broad and flexible
police powers embodied in a plenary authority to enact laws for the purposes of promoting
public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. . . .
[A]lthough plenary, the General Assembly’s police power is not absolute; this distinction
matters. Legislative power is subject to restrictions enumerated in the Constitution and to
limitations inherent in the form of government chosen by the people . . . . Specifically, ours is a
government in which the people have delegated general powers to the General Assembly, but
with the express exception of certain fundamental rights reserved to the people in Article I of our
Constitution. . . .2
Article I is the Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights, which delineates the terms of the
social contract between government and the people that are of such “general, great and essential”
2

A majority of the members of the Court agreed with this construction in Commonwealth
v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (Gettysburg), the first case
decided by this Court involving the Environmental Rights Amendment. Mr. Justice Roberts
wrote that the Commonwealth, prior to the adoption of Article I, Section 27, “possessed the
inherent sovereign power to protect and preserve for its citizens the natural and historic resources
now enumerated in Section 27. The express language of the constitutional amendment merely
recites the ‘inherent and independent rights’ of mankind relative to the environment which are
‘recognized and unalterably established’ by Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.” Id. at 595 (Roberts, J., concurring, joined by Manderino, J.) . . . .
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quality as to be ensconced as “inviolate.” P. Const. art. I, Preamble & § 25; see also P. Const. art.
I, § 2 (“All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness.”). The Declaration of Rights
assumes that the rights of the people articulated in Article I of our Constitution—vis-à-vis the
government created by the people—are inherent in man’s nature and preserved rather than
created by the Pennsylvania Constitution. . . . 3
The first section of Article I “affirms, among other things, that all citizens ‘have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights.’” Pap’s, 812 A.2d at 603 (quoting Pa. Const. art. I, § 1). Among
the inherent rights of the people of Pennsylvania are those enumerated in Section 27, the
Environmental Rights Amendment:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. Const. art. I, § 27 (Natural resources and the public estate)
***
4. Plain Language
Initially, we note that the Environmental Rights Amendment accomplishes two primary
goals, via prohibitory and non-prohibitory clauses: (1) the provision identifies protected rights, to
prevent the state from acting in certain ways, and (2) the provision establishes a nascent
framework for the Commonwealth to participate affirmatively in the development and
enforcement of these rights. Section 27 is structured into three mandatory clauses that define
rights and obligations to accomplish these twin purposes; and each clause mentions “the people.”
A legal challenge pursuant to Section 27 may proceed upon alternate theories that either
the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights or the government has failed in its trustee
obligations, or upon both theories, given that the two paradigms, while serving different purposes
in the amendatory scheme, are also related and overlap to a significant degree. Facing a claim
premised upon Section 27 rights and obligations, the courts must conduct a principled analysis of
whether the Environmental Rights Amendment has been violated.
***
I. First Clause of Section 27—Individual Environmental Rights
According to the plain language of Section 27, the provision establishes two separate
rights in the people of the Commonwealth. The first . . . is the declared “right” of citizens to
clean air and pure water, and to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. This clause affirms a limitation on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.
3

The Court’s recent decision in Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197 (2013) recognized that,
in Pennsylvania, “the concept that certain rights are inherent to mankind, and thus are secured
rather than bestowed by the Constitution, has a long pedigree in Pennsylvania that goes back at
least to the founding of the Republic.” Id. at 208. . . .
29

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2572802

While the subject of the right certainly may be regulated by the Commonwealth, any regulation
is “subordinate to the enjoyment of the right . . . [and] must be regulation purely, not
destruction”; laws of the Commonwealth that unreasonably impair the right are unconstitutional.
The terms “clean air” and “pure water” leave no doubt as to the importance of these
specific qualities of the environment for the proponents of the constitutional amendment and for
the ratifying voters. Moreover, the constitutional provision directs the “preservation” of broadly
defined values of the environment, a construct that necessarily emphasizes the importance of
each value separately, but also implicates a holistic analytical approach to ensure both the
protection from harm or damage and to ensure the maintenance and perpetuation of an
environment of quality for the benefit of future generations.
Although the first clause [of Section 27] does not impose express duties on the political
branches to enact specific affirmative measures to promote clean air, pure water, and the
preservation of the different values of our environment, the right articulated is neither
meaningless nor merely aspirational. The corollary of the people’s Section 27 reservation of right
to an environment of quality is an obligation on the government’s behalf to refrain from unduly
infringing upon or violating the right, including by legislative enactment or executive action.
[E]ach branch of government [must] consider in advance . . . the environmental effect of any
proposed action on the constitutionally protected features. The failure to obtain information
regarding environmental effects does not excuse the constitutional obligation because the
obligation exists a priori to any statute purporting to create a cause of action.
Moreover, as the citizens argue, the constitutional obligation binds all government, state
or local, concurrently. . . .
Also apparent from the language of the constitutional provision are the substantive
standards by which we decide a claim for violation of a right protected by the first clause of
Section 27. The right to “clean air” and “pure water” sets plain conditions by which government
must abide. We recognize that, as a practical matter, air and water quality have relative rather
than absolute attributes. Furthermore, state and federal laws and regulations both govern “clean
air” and “pure water” standards and, as with any other technical standards, the courts generally
defer to agency expertise in making a factual determination whether the benchmarks were met.
Accord 35 P.S. § 6026.102(4) (recognizing that General Assembly “has a duty” to implement
Section 27 and devise environmental remediation standards). That is not to say, however, that
courts can play no role in enforcing the substantive requirements articulated by the
Environmental Rights Amendment in the context of an appropriate challenge. Courts are
equipped and obliged to weigh parties’ competing evidence and arguments, and to issue reasoned
decisions regarding constitutional compliance by the other branches of government. The
benchmark for decision is the express purpose of the Environmental Rights Amendment to be a
bulwark against actual or likely degradation of, inter alia, our air and water quality. Accord
Montana Env’l Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’l Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont. 1999)
(constitutional “inalienable . . . right to a clean and healthful environment” did not protect merely
against type of environmental degradation “conclusively linked” to ill health or physical
endangerment and animal death, but could be invoked to provide anticipatory and preventative
protection against unreasonable degradation of natural resources).
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Section 27 also separately requires the preservation of “natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 27. By calling for the “preservation” of
these broad environmental values, the Constitution again protects the people from governmental
action that unreasonably causes actual or likely deterioration of these features. The
Environmental Rights Amendment does not call for a stagnant landscape; nor, as we explain
below, for the derailment of economic or social development; nor for a sacrifice of other
fundamental values. But, when government acts, the action must, on balance, reasonably account
for the environmental features of the affected locale, as further explained in this decision, if it is
to pass constitutional muster.
***
II. The Second and Third Clauses of Section 27—The Public Trust
The second right reserved by Section 27 is the common ownership of the people,
including future generations, of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources. On its terms, the second
clause . . . applies to a narrower category of “public” natural resources than the first clause of the
provision. The drafters, however, left unqualified the phrase public natural resources, suggesting
that the term fairly implicates relatively broad aspects of the environment, and is amenable to
change over time to conform, for example, with the development of related legal and societal
concerns. At present, the concept of public natural resources includes not only state-owned lands,
waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, such as
ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the
scope of purely private property. See, e.g., 30 Pa. C.S. § 721 (fish: acquisition of property by
Commonwealth); 34 Pa. C.S. § 103(a) (Commonwealth’s ownership of game or wildlife); 71
P.S. § 1340.302(a) (acquisition and disposition of Commonwealth-owned forests). See also 35
P.S. §§ 691.1, 691.501, 691.503 (pollution of [state] waters, as broadly defined by act, is public
nuisance; protection required); 35 P.S. § 1451 (public interest in quantity of water; authorizes
immediate action by governor to conserve natural resources threatened by drought and forest
fire); 35 P.S. §§ 4003, 4013 (violation of Air Pollution Control Act and related regulations,
orders, permits is public nuisance); 35 P.S. §§ 4501, 4502 (immunity for shooting ranges in
public nuisance suits for noise pollution; assumes noise pollution regulated at local level).
***
The third clause of Section 27 establishes the Commonwealth’s duties with respect to
Pennsylvania’s commonly-owned public natural resources, which are both negative (i.e.,
prohibitory) and affirmative (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation and regulations). The
provision establishes the public trust doctrine with respect to these natural resources (the corpus
of the trust), and designates “the Commonwealth” as trustee and the people as the named
beneficiaries. The terms of the trust are construed according to the intent of the settlor which, in
this instance, is “the people.” See Estate of Sykes, 383 A.2d 920, 921 (Pa. 1978) (“To ascertain
this intent, a court examines the words of the instrument and, if necessary, the scheme of
distribution, the circumstances surrounding execution of the [instrument] and other facts bearing
on the question.”).
“Trust” and “trustee” are terms of art that carried legal implications well developed at
Pennsylvania law at the time the amendment was adopted. The statement offered in the General
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Assembly in support of the amendment explained the distinction between the roles of proprietor
and trustee in these terms:
Under the proprietary theory, government deals at arms[’] length with its citizens,
measuring its gains by the balance sheet profits and appreciation it realizes from
its resources operations. Under the trust theory, it deals with its citizens as a
fiduciary, measuring its successes by the benefits it bestows upon all its citizens in
their utilization of natural resources under law.
1970 Pa. Legislative Journal–House at 2273. See also Nat'l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court,
658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (“[P]ublic trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use
public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of
protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes
of the trust.”). The trust relationship does not contemplate a settlor placing blind faith in the
uncontrolled discretion of a trustee; the settlor is entitled to maintain some control and flexibility,
exercised by granting the trustee considerable discretion to accomplish the purposes of the trust. .
..
* * *
As trustee, the Commonwealth is a fiduciary obligated to comply with the terms of the
trust and with standards governing a fiduciary’s conduct. The explicit terms of the trust require
the government to “conserve and maintain” the corpus of the trust. The plain meaning of the
terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation,
diminution, or depletion of our public natural resources. As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a
duty to act toward the corpus of the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty,
and impartiality.
As the parties here illustrate, two separate Commonwealth obligations are implicit in the
nature of the trustee-beneficiary relationship. The first obligation arises from the prohibitory
nature of the constitutional clause creating the trust, and is similar to other negative rights
articulated in the Declaration of Rights. Stated otherwise, the Commonwealth has an obligation
to refrain from performing its trustee duties respecting the environment unreasonably, including
via legislative enactments or executive action. As trustee, the Commonwealth has a duty to
refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public
natural resources, whether such degradation, diminution, or depletion would occur through direct
state action or indirectly, e.g., because of the state’s failure to restrain the actions of private
parties. In this sense, the third clause of the Environmental Rights Amendment is complete
because it establishes broad but concrete substantive parameters within which the
Commonwealth may act. This Court perceives no impediment to citizen beneficiaries enforcing
the constitutional prohibition in accordance with established principles of judicial review.
The second obligation peculiar to the trustee is, as the Commonwealth recognizes, to act
affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative action. Accord Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. at 534 (trusteeship for benefit of state’s people implies legislative duty “to enact such laws
as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its beneficial use in the future to the
people of the state”). The General Assembly has not shied from this duty; it has enacted
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environmental statutes. . . . As these statutes (and related regulations) illustrate, legislative
enactments serve to define regulatory powers and duties, to describe prohibited conduct of
private individuals and entities, to provide procedural safeguards, and to enunciate technical
standards of environmental protection. These administrative details are appropriately addressed
by legislation because, like other “great ordinances” in our Declaration of Rights, the generalized
terms comprising the Environmental Rights Amendment do not articulate them. The call for
complementary legislation, however, does not override the otherwise plain conferral of rights
upon the people.
Of course, the trust’s express directions to conserve and maintain public natural resources
do not require a freeze of the existing public natural resource stock; rather . . . the duties to
conserve and maintain are tempered by legitimate development tending to improve upon the lot
of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.
Within the public trust paradigm of Section 27, the beneficiaries of the trust are “all the
people” of Pennsylvania, including generations yet to come. The trust’s beneficiary designation
has two obvious implications: first, the trustee has an obligation to deal impartially with all
beneficiaries and, second, the trustee has an obligation to balance the interests of present and
future beneficiaries. Dealing impartially with all beneficiaries means that the trustee must treat
all equitably in light of the purposes of the trust. Here, the duty of impartiality implicates
questions of access to and distribution of public natural resources, including consumable
resources such as water, fish, and game. The second, cross-generational dimension of Section 27
reinforces the conservation imperative: future generations are among the beneficiaries entitled to
equal access and distribution of the resources, thus, the trustee cannot be shortsighted. Moreover,
this aspect of Section 27 recognizes the practical reality that environmental changes, whether
positive or negative, have the potential to be incremental, have a compounding effect, and
develop over generations. The Environmental Rights Amendment offers protection equally
against actions with immediate severe impact on public natural resources and against actions
with minimal or insignificant present consequences that are actually or likely to have significant
or irreversible effects in the short or long term.
5. Other considerations
[The Court then described the ecological exploitation that prompted passage of the
Environmental Rights Amendment in 1971.] The decision to affirm the people’s environmental
rights in a Declaration or Bill of Rights, alongside political rights, is relatively rare in American
constitutional law. . . .
That Pennsylvania deliberately chose a course different from virtually all of its sister
states speaks to the Commonwealth’s experience of having the benefit of vast natural resources
whose virtually unrestrained exploitation, while initially a boon to investors, industry, and
citizens, led to destructive and lasting consequences not only for the environment but also for the
citizens’ quality of life. Later generations paid and continue to pay a tribute to early
uncontrolled and unsustainable development financially, in health and quality of life
consequences, and with the relegation to history books of valuable natural and esthetic aspects of
our environmental inheritance. The drafters and the citizens of the Commonwealth who ratified
the Environmental Rights Amendment, aware of this history, articulated the people’s rights and
the government’s duties to the people in broad and flexible terms that would permit not only
reactive but also anticipatory protection of the environment for the benefit of current and future
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generations. Moreover, public trustee duties were delegated concomitantly to all branches and
levels of government in recognition that the quality of the environment is a task with both local
and statewide implications, and to ensure that all government neither infringed upon the people’s
rights nor failed to act for the benefit of the people in this area crucial to the well-being of all
Pennsylvanians.
* * *
B. The Relevant Provisions of Act 13
[The Court then turned to Act 13.] Reviewing the amended Act, few could seriously
dispute how remarkable a revolution is worked by this legislation upon the existing zoning
regimen in Pennsylvania, including residential zones. . . . The displacement of prior planning,
and derivative expectations, regarding land use, zoning, and enjoyment of property is
unprecedented.
* * *
C. Article I, Section 27 Rights in Application
. . . The Commonwealth suggests that Act 13 is an enactment based on valid legislative
objectives and, therefore, falls properly within its exclusive discretionary policy judgment.
In contrast, the citizens construe the Environmental Rights Amendment as protecting
individual rights and devolving duties upon various actors within the political system; and they
claim that breaches of those duties or encroachments upon those rights is, at a minimum,
actionable. According to the citizens, this dispute is not about municipal power, statutory or
otherwise, to develop local policy, but it is instead about compliance with constitutional duties.
Unless the Declaration of Rights is to have no meaning, the citizens are correct.
[The] Environmental Rights Amendment . . . delineates limitations on the
Commonwealth’s power to act as trustee of the public natural resources. [This] constitutional
provision speaks on behalf of the people, to the people directly, rather than through the filter of
the people’s elected representatives to the General Assembly. See Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 25, 27.
The Commonwealth’s obligations as trustee to conserve and maintain the public natural
resources for the benefit of the people, including generations yet to come, create a right in the
people to seek to enforce the obligations. . . .
***
The type of constitutional challenge presented today is as unprecedented in Pennsylvania
as is the legislation that engendered it. But, the challenge is in response to history seeming to
repeat itself: an industry, offering the very real prospect of jobs and other important economic
benefits, seeks to exploit a Pennsylvania resource, to supply an energy source much in demand.
The political branches have responded with a comprehensive scheme that accommodates the
recovery of the resource. By any responsible account, the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale
Formation will produce a detrimental effect on the environment, on the people, their children,
and future generations, and potentially on the public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental
effects of coal extraction. The litigation response was not available in the nineteenth century,
since there was no Environmental Rights Amendment. The response is available now.
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The challenge here is premised upon that part of our organic charter that now explicitly
guarantees the people’s right to an environment of quality and the concomitant expressed
reservation of a right to benefit from the Commonwealth’s duty of management of our public
natural resources. The challengers here are citizens—just like the citizenry that reserved the
right in our charter. They are residents or members of local legislative and executive bodies, and
several localities directly affected by natural gas development and extraction in the Marcellus
Shale Formation. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s characterization of the dispute, the citizens
seek not to expand the authority of local government but to vindicate fundamental constitutional
rights that, they say, have been compromised by a legislative determination that violates a public
trust. The Commonwealth’s efforts to minimize the import of this litigation by suggesting it is
simply a dispute over public policy voiced by a disappointed minority requires a blindness to the
reality here and to Pennsylvania history, including Pennsylvania constitutional history; and, the
position ignores the reality that Act 13 has the potential to affect the reserved rights of every
citizen of this Commonwealth now, and in the future. . . .
***
2. Section 3304
***
We have explained that, among other fiduciary duties under Article I, Section 27, the
General Assembly has the obligation to prevent degradation, diminution, and depletion of our
public natural resources, which it may satisfy by enacting legislation that adequately restrains
actions of private parties likely to cause harm to protected aspects of our environment. We are
constrained to hold that [the statute] falls considerably short of meeting this obligation . . . .
***
. . . Act 13 simply displaces development guidelines, guidelines which offer strict
limitations on industrial uses in sensitive zoning districts; instead, Act 13 permits industrial oil
and gas operations as a use “of right” in every zoning district throughout the Commonwealth,
including in residential, commercial, and agricultural districts. . . . [T]he provision compels
exposure of otherwise protected areas to environmental and habitability costs associated with this
particular industrial use . . . . The entirely new legal regimen alters existing expectations of
communities and property owners and substantially diminishes natural and esthetic values of the
local environment, which contribute significantly to a quality of environmental life in
Pennsylvania. . . . In constitutional terms, the Act degrades the corpus of the trust. . . .
A second difficulty arising from [the] requirement that local government permit industrial
uses in all zoning districts is that some properties and communities will carry much heavier
environmental and habitability burdens than others. This disparate effect is irreconcilable with
the express command that the trustee will manage the corpus of the trust for the benefit of “all
the people.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 27. A trustee must treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the
purposes of the trust. . . . Act 13’s blunt approach fails to account for this constitutional
command at all . . . . Imposing statewide environmental and habitability standards appropriate for
the heaviest of industrial areas in sensitive zoning districts lowers environmental and habitability
protections for affected residents and property owners below the existing threshold and permits
significant degradation of public natural resources. The outright ban on local regulation of oil
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and gas operations (such as ordinances seeking to conform development to local conditions) that
would mitigate the effect, meanwhile, propagates serious detrimental and disparate effects on the
corpus of the trust.
To be sure, the Commonwealth and its amici make compelling policy arguments that
Pennsylvania’s populace will benefit from the exploitation of the natural gas found in the
Marcellus Shale Formation. . . .
If economic and energy benefits were the only considerations at issue, this particular
argument would carry more weight. . . . [But] [t]o comply with the constitutional command, the
General Assembly must exercise its police powers to foster sustainable development in a manner
that respects the reserved rights of the people to a clean, healthy, and esthetically-pleasing
environment.
For these reasons, we are constrained to hold that the degradation of the corpus of the
trust and the disparate impact on some citizens sanctioned by . . . Act 13 are incompatible with
the express command of the Environmental Rights Amendment. We recognize the importance of
this legislation, and do not question the intentions behind it; we recognize, too, the urgency with
which the political branches believe they must act to secure the benefits of developing the
unconventional natural gas industry. By any measure, this legislation is of sweeping import. But,
in that urgency, it is apparent that . . . constitutional commands have been swept aside. Act 13’s
unauthorized use of the public trust assets is unprecedented and constitutionally infirm, even
assuming that the trustee believes it is acting solely and in good faith to advance the economic
interests of the beneficiaries.
Notes
1.
The Robinson Township opinion represents the most detailed judicial
pronouncement on the PTD in modern times. One of its most important aspects is the
characterization of environmental rights as constitutional. Note that while Pennsylvania has a
trust provision in its constitution, Justice Castille began his public trust discussion by describing
the “applicable constitutional paradigm,” including the Enivironmental Rights Amendment as
part of Article 1’s more basic affirmation of “‘inherent and indefeasible rights.’” See Pa. Const.
art. I, § 1 (setting forth “Inherent Rights of Mankind” to include “certain inherent and
indefeasible rights”); Robinson, 83 A.3d at 948 (plurality opinion). These rights, Justice Castille
emphasized, arise from the social contract between people and their government. Such rights are
“of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced as ‘inviolate.’” Id. at 947–48
(citing Pa. Const. art. I, pmbl., art. I, § 25).
The opinion makes clear that the 1971 Environmental Rights Amendment (art. I, § 27)
did not create new rights, but rather enumerated the pre-existing rights that the people had
reserved to themselves in creating government. Might the Robinson Township plurality’s
constitutional characterization of the public trust apply to other states without express trust
amendments to their constitutions? Many other states have similar declarations of inherent rights
forming the constitutional paradigm upon which the plurality opinion in Robinson relies.4 Even
4

See, e.g., Or. Const. art. I, § 1 (entitled “Natural rights inherent in people,” declaring
“that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority,
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in states lacking such declarations of inherent rights, aren’t the democratic understandings
underlying government authority fairly equal across the states? Does the Robinson Township
plurality opinion, with its focus on inhent rights of citizens, illuminate Professor Joseph Sax’s
famous statement that the public trust demarcates a society of “citizens rather than of serfs?” See
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 484 (1970)).5
2.
In a non-excerpted but important part of the opinion (Part II), a majority of the
court held unequivocally that the political question doctrine did not bar judicial review.
Robinson, 83 A.3d at 925–30. Typically, government attorneys defending legislative action
against trust claims assert the political question doctrine as a procedural bar, claiming that the
legislature, not the judiciary, has the last word on policy. See id. at 925 (characterizing the
government’s argument in the following terms: “According to the [government], the [court]
interfered with the exercise of the General Assembly’s constitutional police powers by
‘revisiting’ and ‘second-guessing’ legislative choices”). In the Robinson case, the government
emphasized the highly politicized context of fracking to insinuate that the judiciary should stay
out of the fray. The court noted that the defense called into question the separation of powers
between the branches. It unequivocally held that it is within the province of the judiciary to
decide constitutional questions — and hold legislatures accountable where citizen’s rights are at
stake:
Responsive litigation rhetoric raising the specter of judicial interference with legislative
policy does not remove a legitimate legal claim from the Court’s consideration; the
political question doctrine is a shield and not a sword to deflect judicial review.
and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness. . . .”); Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.”); Haw. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Rights of
Individuals. All persons are free by nature and are equal in their inherent and inalienable
rights.”); Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 1 (“Equal Rights. All men are possessed of equal and
inalienable natural rights. . . .”); N.D. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All individuals are by nature equally
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty. . . .”).
5
In the federal atmospheric trust litigation case against the Obama administration, thirtythree law professors, including Joseph Sax, submitted an amicus brief iterating the constitutional
basis of the federal public trust doctrine. See See Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiffs, Alec L. v. Lisa Jackson, 2011 WL 8583134 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 4:11-cv02203 EMC), at 14, available at
http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Hansen%20Amicus%20.pdf (“The
constitutional reserved powers doctrine in conjunction with the public trust prevents any one
legislature from depriving a future legislature of the natural resources necessary to provide for
the well-being and survival of its citizens. . . . Through the [public trust doctrine], the
Constitution governs for the perpetual preservation of the Nation.”) (The Alec L litigation is
discussed in chapter 11 (p. __). For another analysis of the constitutional underpinnings of the
public trust doctrine, see Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law's DNA, 4
WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 281 (2014).
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Furthermore, a statute is not exempt from a challenge brought for judicial consideration
simply because it is said to be the General Assembly’s expression of policy rendered in a
polarized political context. . . . As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
The idea that any legislature, state or federal, can conclusively determine for
the people and for the courts that what it enacts in the form of law, or what it
authorizes its agents to do, is consistent with the fundamental law, is in
opposition to the theory of our institutions. The duty rests upon all courts,
federal and state, . . . to see to it that no right secured by the supreme law of
the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation. This function and duty of the
judiciary distinguishes the American system from all other systems of
government. The perpetuity of our institutions, and the liberty which is
enjoyed under them, depend, in no small degree, upon the power given the
judiciary to declare null and void all legislation that is clearly repugnant to the
supreme law of the land. (citation omitted).
Id. at 928–29, quoting Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527–28 (1898).
Other courts have emphasized the court’s role in enforcing the trust. As the Hawaii
Supreme Court has emphasized, it is decidedly the role of courts to prevent “improvident
disposition of an irreplaceable res” held in public trust. In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000). Does it matter whether citizens, in bringing
trust claims, characterize the trust as a constitutional or a common law doctrine?
3.
Note the expansive res of the trust as characterized by the Robinson plurality: “At
present, the concept of public natural resources includes not only state-owned lands, waterways,
and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air,
surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the scope of
purely private property.” Does the opinion essentially follow the public concern test of Illinois
Central? Does the approach mark a move away from antebellum characterizations of trust assets
as primarily limited to streambeds? One of the main resources impacted by the fracking
operations in Pennsylvania is groundwater, which communities rely on for domestic drinking
water supplies. Should there be any question as to whether groundwater is included in the trust?
For treatment of groundwater under the public trust, see Jack Tuholske, Trusting the Public
Trust: Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 189
(2008).
4.
The Robinson plurality opinion iterates a broad array of fiduciary duties. Which
are procedural in nature, and which are substantive? When elaborating on fiduciary duties, the
opinion frequently refers to standards applicable to private trustees, as set forth in the
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS. See Robinson, 83 A.3d at 957. Specifically, the court cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (stating that the “duty of prudence generally requires
trustees to exercise ordinary skill, prudence, and caution in managing corpus of trust);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170) (stating that the trustee has duty of loyalty to
administer trust solely in beneficiary’s interest and not his own); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 232 (setting forth trustee’s duty of impartiality). The standards of a private trustee are
well-established and quite detailed. Is the court essentially saying that the same basic standards
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apply to public trustees, and also that such standards provide an adequate basis for judicial
review? How do they add to existing statutory standards?
5.
In a non-excerpted portion of Justice Castille’s opinion, the court describes the
extensive history of environmental damage to Pennyslvania’s striking natural resources —
damage that includes decades of clearcut logging and coal mining. 83 A.3d at 960–61. The
opinion seems to portray the state’s history as being unique and uses it to explain the strong
intent behind the Environmental Rights Amendment. But is the history unique? Hasn’t every
area of the United States suffered an environmental damage, as evidenced by exinct salmon runs
in the Pacific Northwest, clearcut rainforests of Alaska, and the lost wetlands of the Florida
Everglades? Wouldn't such damage form a backdrop and justification for any modern trust
approach that provides increased protection?
6.
The Robinson plurality emphasized the fiduciary duty to treat all beneficiaries
with impartiality. The pro-fracking legislation challenged in the case seemed to favor natural gas
interests at the expense of residents who suffered severe environmental degradation. Indeed, the
lead opinion by the Chief Justice, albeit in the context of the Environmental Rights provision of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 27, recognized these same inequalities
associated with the “uniform application” of Act 13 statewide:
A second difficulty arising from Section 3304’s requirement that local government
permit industrial uses in all zoning districts is that some properties and communities will
carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others. This disparate
effect is irreconcilable with the express command that the trustee will manage the corpus
of the trust for the benefit of “all the people.”
83 A.3d at 1007.
What political incentives provoke legislators to favor business interests even when doing
so harms communities? Could the fiduciary duty of impartiality be a game changer in
governmental permit processes? Could it give legs to the notion of environmental justice? And
how could the duty of loyalty, also mentioned in the opinion, change the current legislative
approach? The opinion also underscores the duty to future generations. How should the
legislature balance the needs of present and future generations? In which ways are they
compatible, and in which ways are they at odds with each other?
7.
Much of Justice Castille’s opinion focuses on private property rights threatened
by fracking. As he notes, the groundwater and air contamination impairs the basic habitability of
communities. The opinion demonstrates how the public trust secures the natural infrastructure
necessary of enjoyment of private property rights. The interrelationship of private property rights
and public trust rights is further explored in chapter 9.
8.
The Robinson Township decision generated considerable interest in
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment. Prior to the opinion, the amendment had not
carried much weight in curbing legislative or agency action. A few other state trust constitutional
provisions have suffered the same fate. But as the Robinson Township plurality shows, the trust
represents a formidable and timeless principle; and courts can breathe new life into the trust
despite adverse or weak precedent. Professor John Dernbach, whose scholarship on the
Amendment was cited several times by the court, has compiled the legislative history of Article
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I, Section 27, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474660. For his
analysis of the Robinson decision and its impact across public trust law, see John Dernbach,
Robinson Township and the Role of the Public Trust Doctrine in State Constitutions, 45 Envtl.
L. (forthcoming 2015). For an analysis of other state constitutional trust provisions, see page __
below.
Note on the Source of the Public Trust Doctrine,
According to Justice Kennedy
1.
Is the public trust a legitimate exercise of state judicial or legislative power? The
first step in legitimation is to ground the trust in the federal constitution or in common law. In
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283–87 (1997), Justice Kennedy offered this
analysis of the constitutional basis for the doctrine:
The Court from an early date has acknowledged that the people of each of the Thirteen
Colonies at the time of independence "became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to
the general government." Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). Then, in
Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), the Court concluded that States entering
the Union after 1789 did so on an "equal footing" with the original States and so have
similar ownership over these "sovereign lands." In consequence of this rule, a State's title
to these sovereign lands arises from the equal footing doctrine and is "conferred not by
Congress but by the Constitution itself" Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977). The importance of these lands to state
sovereignty explains our longstanding commitment to the principle that the United States
is presumed to have held navigable waters in acquired territory for the ultimate benefit of
future States and "that disposals by the United States during the territorial period are not
lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." [United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49 (1926).]
The principle which underlies the equal footing doctrine and the strong
presumption of state ownership is that navigable waters uniquely implicate sovereign
interests. The principle arises from ancient doctrines. See, e.g., INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN,
Lib. 11, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841) ("Rivers and ports are public; hence the
right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common"). The special treatment of navigable
waters in English law was recognized in Bracton's time. He stated that "all rivers and
ports are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons. The use of river
banks, as of the river itself, is also public." 2 H. Bracton. DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968). The Magna Carta provided that
the Crown would remove "all fish-weirs . . . from the Thames and the Medway and
throughout all England, except on the sea coast." M. Evans & R. Jack, SOURCES OF
ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 53 (1984); see also [Martin v.] Waddell
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(p. 60) (tracing tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta).
2.
The Court in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894), summarizing English
common law, stated:
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that the title in the
soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water mark, is in the King;
except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant,
or by prescription or usage . . . and that this title, jus privatum, whether in the King or in a
subject, is held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.
3.
Justice Kennedy elaborated on the source of the public trust doctrine in PPL
Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1234–35 (2012):
The public trust doctrine is of ancient origin. Its roots trace to Roman civil law and its
principles can be found in the English common law on public navigation and fishing
rights over tidal lands and in the state laws of this country. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S.,
at 284–286; Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892); D. Slade,
PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 3–8, 15–24 (1990); see, e.g., National
Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 718–724 (1983); Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9–10 (1821). Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, however, which is the
constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the public trust
doctrine remains a matter of state law, see Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 285 (Illinois
Central, a Supreme Court public trust case, was "‘necessarily a statement of Illinois
law'"); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (same), subject as well to
the federal power to regulate vessels and navigation under the Commerce Clause and
admiralty power. While equal-footing cases have noted that the State takes title to the
navigable waters and their beds in trust for the public, see Shively, 152 U.S., at 49, the
contours of that public trust do not depend upon the Constitution. Under accepted
principles of federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust over waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title
under the equal-footing doctrine.
The statement that "the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law," remains
dictum, as there was no issue raised in the case concerning the validity of federal public trust
law. Nevertheless, the statement is bound to be cited by federal defendants resisting any public
trust obligation. Chapter 11 considers whether Justice Kennedy has properly interpreted Illinois
Central as a statement of state law, and whether the doctrine should apply to the federal
sovereign as well as state sovereigns.
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